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Admission of a State to the United Nations (U.N., or "the Organiza-
tion") entails significant obligations on the part of the admitted State. As
provided under Article 4, paragraph 1, the State must be able and willing
to fulfill the obligations contained in the U.N. Charter.' As provided un-
der Article 17, the State will be assessed certain dues contributions.2
Peacekeeping and other U.N. missions, though participation in them is
not obligatory, will entail further obligations on the participating States,
and the General Assembly has authority to assess those costs across the
membership.3 International responsibility may arise where the admitted
State does not fulfill these obligations or its conduct breaches other
rules. Within the U.N. Charter itself, provisions exist for expulsion4 and
for various forms of suspension'-measures available against the admit-
ted State that fails to fulfill its obligations.
Yet admission is not a matter for the admitted State alone. For a
State to be admitted to the United Nations, two things must happen: first,
the State must seek admission, and second, the United Nations must de-
cide to grant it. The second part of the operation entails a coordinated act
of the existing Member States as constituents of the two main organs of
the United Nations; that is, for the United Nations to confer membership
on a given State seeking to be admitted, the Charter requires the affirma-
tive recommendation of the Security Council and the decision of the
General Assembly to admit the State. Though the obligations and poten-
tial international responsibility of the admitted State are relatively clear,
less so are the obligations and responsibility of those actors whose deci-
sions resulted in the State being admitted. Considering that the act of
1. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1 ("Membership in the United Nations is open to all...
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.").
2. Id. art. 17.
3. Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 164-67
(July 20).
4. U.N. Charter art. 6.
5. Id. art. 5 (discussing suspension of membership with respect to a State subject to
preventive or enforcement action); id. art. 19 (discussing suspension of General Assembly
voting rights with respect to a State "in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions").
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admission is the product of joint decision by the admitted State on the
one hand, and by the existing Member States and the Organization on
the other, it would be incongruent if admission-an act having particular
legal and political consequences at the international level-were to im-
pose obligations only on the admitted State. The present Article asks
whether admitting a State to membership in the United Nations entails
any responsibility on those parties whose decisions accepted the admit-
ted State's application for membership and, if so, what the particular
incidents of that responsibility might be.
The work of the ILC concerning responsibility over the past ten
years has brought a significantly greater degree of systematization to that
field than existed before. There was a time when responsibility was seen
as a subject restricted to the substantive field of investment protection.
This narrow conception led the ILC to a dead end, for it simultaneously
excluded from the drafting work much of what international law regu-
lates (or seeks to regulate) and encompassed divergent positions that
could not be reconciled. International law is more than the law of in-
vestment protection, and the law of investment protection stems from
bilateral and other arrangements, each distinctive on the terms of treaties
adopted.6 A shift-and widening-of this conception led the drafting
project to concern itself with the secondary rules applicable to all sub-
stantive fields.7
The ILC in August 2001 adopted Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).8 This brought to
fruition a drafting project on a topic that had been selected for codifica-
tion in 19539 and been headed, successively, by five Special
Rapporteurs.' ARSIWA by its terms limits itself to the international
6. James Crawford & Tom Grant, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Foreigners, in
THE HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS AND AP-
PRAISAL 77, 104-05 (John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2007).
7. See Int'l Law Comm'n [ILC], Draft Articles on Responsibility of Statesfor Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, 76-77, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Oct. 24, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 ILC
Report] ("The articles do not attempt to define the content of the international obligations, the
breach of which gives rise to responsibility. This is the function of the primary rules, whose
codification would involve restating most of substantive customary and conventional interna-
tional law.").
8. Id. 72-73. The General Assembly "welcome[d]" the International Law Commis-
sion's (ILC) draft and commentary text and "commend[ed]" it to the consideration of the
Member States. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, at 1-2, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001). For the full
text of the ILC draft, see id. at 2-13.
9. See G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (Dec. 7, 1953). The ILC did not
appoint a special rapporteur for the topic until 1955. See Summary Records of the 315th Meet-
ing, [1955] 1 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 190, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
10. For the Special Rapporteur's final observations on the Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), see James Crawford, The ILC's
1097Summer 2009]
Michigan Journal of International Law
responsibility of States. Article 57 in particular reserves the responsibil-
ity of international organizations for future consideration. The ILC upon
completion of ARSIWA turned to international organizations as a dis-
tinct part of the general law of international responsibility." By 2001,
when the General Assembly called on the ILC to start work on the topic
of responsibility of international organizations, 2 various authorities, in-
cluding the International Law Association (ILA), already had recognized
the topic as meriting study. 3 Since then, the Special Rapporteur for re-
sponsibility of international organizations, Giorgio Gaja,' 4 has submitted
six reports, and the ILC has proposed draft articles covering chief parts
of the topic.'5 The completed ARSIWA and extensively developed draft
articles on international organizations furnish a detailed statement of
rules in the field of responsibility. The commentary adopted by the ILC
in connection with these drafting projects and the observations of States
and international organizations transmitted to the ILC during the course
of drafting elucidate the proposed and adopted texts. Writers, States,
courts, and tribunals, having this material now in hand, have begun to
relate particular substantive fields of law to the regime of responsibility. 
6
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 874 (2002).
11. ILC, First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/532 (Mar. 26, 2003) (prepared by Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter First Report of Special
Rapporteur Gaja]. The initiation of the topic as part of the ILC work program is summarized
in ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Ninth Session,
325-27, U.N. Doc. A/62/10 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ILC Report].
12. G.A. Res. 56/82, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/82 (Dec. 12, 2001).
13. Int'l Law Ass'n [ILA], Second Report on Accountability of International Organisa-
tions, 69 INT'L L. Ass'N REP. CONF. 875 (2000) [hereinafter ILA London Conference]; see
also First Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 11, 9H 1-3.
14. Mr. Gaja is a Professor of International Law at the University of Florence, Italy and
a member of the ILC (1999 to present). See http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdflls/Gaja-bio.pdf
(last visited May 31, 2009).
15. For a synopsis of work on the topic, see the ILC website, http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/guide/9_1 1.htm (last visited May 31,2009).
16. See, for example, the multiple International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) cases involving responsibility of a State toward investors: inter alia, for
representations concerning zoning law, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 164-65 (2004); for performance of participation contracts by a
State corporation, EnCana Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No., Award, 91 154-61
(2006); for ensuring that "litigation is free from discrimination against a foreign litigant and
that the foreign litigant should not become the victim of sectional or local prejudice," Loewen
Group v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case. No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 91 123 (2003); but
not for "unforeseen geological conditions," Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 91 268 (2005).
For writers, see NINA JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES (2000); PHOEBE OKOWA, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLU-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political
Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2007); Mark Toufayan, A Return
to Communitarianism? Reacting to "Serious Breaches of Obligations Arising Under Peremp-
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To date, the practice of the United Nations in admitting States as
new members has been little considered in connection with international
responsibility. Yet it is by no means to be excluded a priori that respon-
sibility could arise in any given area of practice; international law lays
claim to be a general system of regulation, so wherever there is interna-
tional activity, the possibility exists that the law, and with it
responsibility, will follow. Admission of a State as a member of the
United Nations is a highly significant area of international activity. It
affects the position of the admitted State in public order, and it affects
public order generally. Writers have observed in particular that the ad-
mission of so many new States in the period of decolonization changed
the character of the United Nations from a wartime alliance of States
possessing a more or less clear unity of purpose, to a universal organiza-
tion encompassing all States regardless of governmental system or
political interests.17 The United Nations as it now exists, the make-up of
its various subsidiary organs, and the diverse activities in which these
engage all can be related back to this practice of admission.
The United Nations as a universal organization admits all States that
apply for admission. This approach was not ordained from the start. The
U.N. Charter sets out criteria and procedures that were intended to gov-
ern admission and, on their terms, would appear to have been designed
to limit admission. Under Charter Article 4(1), the Organization is open
to "all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained
in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able
and willing to carry out these obligations."'8 This provision, as well as
paragraph 2 of Article 4, received authoritative interpretation by the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ),' 9 and the position initially seemed
clear that the admission of States to the United Nations was to be a regu-
lated process. As the Court said in the Advisory Opinion on Conditions
of Admission, Article 4(1) "clearly constitutes a legal regulation of the
question of the admission of new States. 2°
The position, however, was reached by the end of the first ten years
of the Charter era that little, if any, substantive objection would block
tory Norms of General International Law" Under the Law of State Responsibility and United
Nations Law, 42 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 197 (2004); Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsi-
bility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (2002).
17. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note *, at 1.
18. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1.
19. Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3); Conditions of Admission of State for Membership in
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57 (May 28).
20. Conditions of Admission of State for Membership in United Nations, 1948 I.C.J.
57, at 62-63.
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admission of a State to the United Nations. Dag Hammerskjold, as Sec-
retary-General, said in 1954:
Almost half the countries of Europe are absent from the council
tables. It is inevitable that the effectiveness and influence of the
United Nations are lessened by this fact, not only as regards the
questions of direct concern to Europe, but other problems, too,
where the experience of the European peoples would make pos-
sible a great contribution towards their solution. This
consideration applies also to the peoples in other parts of the
world who do not yet have the representation in the United Na-
tions to which their role in world affairs entitles them.2'
This stated a basis in policy for opening the United Nations to all
States. Any selective principle, it was said, must give way in the interest
of full representation, lest the "effectiveness and influence" of the Or-
ganization be put in jeopardy. Hammerskjold's call for universality came
amidst a crisis over applications for admission. Some sixteen applicants
were denied membership. The resultant "logjam" involved the compet-
ing East-West blocs and their various preferred candidate States. It took
center stage in successive General Assembly sessions until, finally, in
1955, the Member States saw to it that most States awaiting admission
were in fact admitted. Few, if any, States seeking admission since have
been denied membership,23 and no application for admission has been
long delayed.24 If admission as practiced since the 1950s has not been as
the Charter originally conceived it, the question arises whether admis-
sion, at least in some instances, has been a breach of Charter obligations.
It also has been observed that readiness to admit States without con-
sidering their effective capacity has reduced the incentives to delay
independence and, perhaps, has increased the incidence of so-called
"failed States."25 If the consistent practice of admitting applicants to
membership has fostered the formation of new States, then admission
well may be said to have had injurious effects: a significant minority of
21. The Secretary-General, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Member
States on the Work of the United Nations, at xii, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/2663 (July 21, 1954).
22. GRANT, supra note *, at 64-67.
23. The possible exception was the Republic of Viet Nam (South Viet Nam), which was
forcibly absorbed into the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam before either was admitted. The
Socialist Republic was admitted in 1977. See G.A. Res. 32/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/2 (Sept.
20, 1977); S.C. Res. 413, U.N. Doc. S/RES/413 (July 20, 1977).
24. These transactions are considered in detail in GRANT, supra note *, at 63-99.
25. See GERARD KREIJEN, The Transformation of Sovereignty and African Independ-
ence: No Shortcuts to Statehood, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
45, 86 (Gerard Kreijen et al eds., 2002).
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new States in the U.N. era have lacked the effective capacity needed to
sustain public order in the territories for which they are responsible, and
some non-State communities preceding these might not have sought in-
dependence, if they had not had something like a guarantee of U.N.
admission. The existence of States lacking effectiveness seems difficult
to separate entirely from U.N. admission. Admission is a statement that
on the terms of the U.N. Charter must indicate that the admitted entity is
a State. Unless statehood is taken to have absolutely no factual or effec-
tive dimension, the parties that decided to admit an applicant would
seem to be saying that the entity has the effective capacity to exist as a
State. Few, if any, writers have asked whether admission might include a
commitment by those parties to take reparatory measures toward the
admitted entity to assure at least its minimum and sustainable effective
capacity. An obligation to redistribute wealth across States in the interna-
tional system, posited by some writers and States,27 perhaps is a special
incident of a wider commitment along such lines. The question here to
be considered is whether admission, in addition to entailing certain obli-
gations on the part of the State admitted, might impose certain
obligations on the parties from whose decisions admission resulted.
Where there is a breach of an obligation, the possibility of responsi-
bility arises. Where there is responsibility, the responsible party faces a
further obligation: it must make reparation. Responsibility in interna-
tional law thus involves a primary obligation-that is, a substantive rule
requiring that a party subject to it act or refrain from acting in a specified
way; and it involves a secondary obligation-that is, an obligation to
make reparation where a breach of a substantive rule can be attributed to
a particular actor.2 ' To speak of responsibility in connection with any
particular field of law involves both identifying the substantive obliga-
tions existing in that field, and determining whether a given act in breach
26. On effectiveness and statehood, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-95 (2d ed. 2007).
27. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, [ 17-56, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome]; Declaration on the
Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Declaration on the Right to Development]. Literature on the topic is extensive. See, e.g.,
Philip Alston, The Right to Development at the International Level, in THE RIGHT TO DEVEL-
OPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 99-114 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed. 1980); see also
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999); Philip Alston, The Case of the Right to
Development, 1988 HARV. HUM. RTs YB. 1.
28. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/200 I/Add. I (Pt. 2).
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of a substantive obligation attaches to a party.29 A related matter arises,
whether a party so determined to be responsible is amenable to any
process rendering it accountable for its conduct. ° The present Article
considers what identifiable substantive obligations might be relevant to
admission; whether admission as practiced has resulted in a breach of
obligation; and whether any such breach might impose international re-
sponsibility on the international actors involved in the decision to admit
new States. The Article further considers what future reparative obliga-
tions such responsibility might entail.
Part I begins by considering in brief the application of the concepts
of obligation, breach, and responsibility to international organizations.
Part II then asks what specific, substantive obligations exist with respect
to the admission of States as new members of the United Nations. Three
categories of substantive obligations are considered: obligations arising
under Charter Article 4; obligations relating to the peace and security
functions of the United Nations; and obligations belonging to the general
international law rules which subsist outside (or alongside) the Charter.
Part III asks what party or parties may be identified as injured parties in
connection with admission-a question that one may approach by asking
to what party or parties a substantive obligation in this field is owed. The
Member States, the admitted State, the United Nations itself, and the
"international community as a whole" are possible beneficiaries of the
obligation. Part IV examines the problems of attribution and accountabil-
ity, the former being in this context particularly a problem of the relation
between an international organization and its Member States, and the
latter being particularly a problem of the underdevelopment of mecha-
nisms, judicial or otherwise, by which to examine claims against an
organization.
Even if satisfactory solutions are found for the several problems of
applicable obligations, potentially injured parties, and attribution and
accountability, there remains the question of what particular injurious
consequences might arise from the act of admitting a State to the United
Nations. In seeking to identify injurious consequences, properly defined,
one must consider problems of causation, for, as in national tort systems,
not every harmful result is sufficiently proximate to an act for the actor
to bear responsibility for it. This is addressed in Part V. The possibility of
29. For a discussion regarding both the relation between primary and secondary obliga-
tion in the scheme of the ILC's work on State responsibility and the "trans-substantive"
application of the responsibility regime, see Crawford, supra note 10, at 876-79.
30. On mechanisms of accountability for international organizations, see James Craw-
ford, Fifth Steinkraus-Cohen International Law Lecture: Holding International Organisations
and Their Members to Account (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://www.unawestminster.org.
uk/pdf/crawford-lecture.pdf (last visited July 7, 2009) [hereinafter Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture].
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an obligation to make reparation is considered in Part VI, a matter which
leads one to consider the several forms such reparation might take for a
"wrongfully admitted State"-if such a situation indeed may be said to
exist.
I. THE RELATION BETWEEN OBLIGATION,
BREACH, AND RESPONSIBILITY
As in ARSIWA, the draft articles that the ILC has proposed on the
topic of responsibility of international organizations express the relation
between obligation, breach, and responsibility.' Draft article 3,
paragraph 1 provides as follows: "Every internationally wrongful act of
an international organization entails the international responsibility of
the international organization. 32 According to draft article 3, paragraph
2, "[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of an international
organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is
attributable to the international organization under international law; and
31. The later draft articles have followed closely the structure and wording of
ARSIWA. According to Gaja:
It would be unreasonable for the Commission to take a different approach on issues
relating to international organizations that are parallel to those concerning States,
unless there are specific reasons for doing so. This is not meant to state a presump-
tion that the issues are to be regarded as similar and would lead to analogous
solutions. The intention only is to suggest that, should the study concerning particu-
lar issues relating to international organizations produce results that do not differ
from those reached by the Commission in its analysis of State responsibility, the
model of the draft articles on State responsibility should be followed both in the
general outline and in the wording of the new text.
First Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 11, 1 11, at 6-7. The ILC has received
comments suggesting problems with this approach See, e.g., ILC, Responsibility of Interna-
tional Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International
Organizations, at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/545 (June 25, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Comments]
(comment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) listing as problems (i) the lack of devel-
oped reasoning to support borrowing "certain key concepts" from ARSIWA, (ii) the
"fundamental[]" difference that States have general competence and international organiza-
tions do not, and (iii) the contrast between the "functional[] and organizational[]" similarity of
States to one another and the "significant differences among international organizations"); see
also ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Re-
ceived from International Organizations, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/582 (May 1, 2007)
[hereinafter 2007 Comments] (comment by the European Commission); ILC, Responsibility of
International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Or-
ganizations, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/568 (Mar. 17, 2006) (comment by the World Health
Organization (WHO)).
32. ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles and Texts of the Draft
Articles 1, 2 and 3 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.632
(June 4, 2003).
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(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that
international organization. 33
These provisions may be considered by starting with the concept of
the prior international obligation, and proceeding from there to responsi-
bility and resultant future obligations. An obligation must exist in the
first place, if a situation is to involve responsibility. Next, a breach of
obligation must have occurred . Third, the breach must be attributable to
the international organization.35 Where these conditions are met, a
wrongful act has occurred and international responsibility is established.
From responsibility follow certain legal consequences, in particular the
obligation to make reparation. The draft articles deal with the legal con-
sequences of an internationally wrongful act under draft articles 31
through 43.
The innovation in the work on state responsibility had been to ex-
clude definitions of substantive prior obligations. From the 1920s
through the 1960s, drafters had seen international responsibility as an
invitation to codify the entirety of international investment law.36 As
noted above, this was too ambitious, for agreement could not be reached
as to a globally applicable body of substantive rules concerning the pro-
tection of investors. At the same time, it was significantly too narrow, for
international responsibility concerns all acts or omissions of a State, not
just its activities in a given field such as investment protection. The ILC
eventually directed its efforts instead to attribution. The drafting project
in this way came to set out rules concerning how and to what entity re-
sponsibility may attach. The existence of an international obligation was
assumed; it was left to sources outside the Articles to specify the content
and origin of the obligation. As ARSIWA Article 12 provides, "It]here is
a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that
State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation,
regardless of its origin or character." Draft article 8, paragraph 1 of the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, mutatis
mutandis, expresses the same relation.37 Breach, then, is an act or omis-
sion "not in conformity" with an obligation-whatever that obligation
might be. In considering responsibility generally, the reasons are sound
for leaving out a catalogue of the substantive obligations contained in
international law. In considering responsibility in connection with a spe-
33. Id.
34. Id. draft art. 3(2)(b).
35. Id. draft art. 3(2)(a).
36. Crawford & Grant, supra note 6, 86-93.
37. ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles and Texts of the Draft




cific field of activity-e.g., admission of States to the United Nations-it
is necessary however to give at least a tentative description of the prior
obligations. It then may be possible to define certain acts or omissions
constituting their breach.
It is also necessary, whether considering responsibility as a general
topic or its application to a specific field, to say whether a given breach
is attributable to the international organization under international law.
This is the attribution requirement under the second paragraph of draft
article 3. Draft articles 4 through 7 set out the rules of attribution. The
character of an international organization as a compound entity com-
prised of States or other organizations themselves capable of bearing
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts is one of several factors
distinguishing the international organization from a State. It imparts a
certain complexity to the matter of attribution, which the new drafting
project has had to address without benefit of direct transposition from
ARSIWA.
Finally, if the elements of responsibility obtain in a given situation,
then legal consequences follow. The consequences are not the same in all
situations. Possible legal consequences of responsibility, set out in draft
articles 31 to 43, will differ depending upon the substantive obligation
breached and the resulting situation. Certain consequences clearly follow
from admission of an applicant to membership in the United Nations.
Once admitted, the applicant is a Member State of the United Nations.
The Member State-assuming its good standing as a dues-paying mem-
ber, etc.-then has rights under the Charter to participate in the various
principal organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations. Less
obvious are the wider legal consequences of admission, both for the Or-
ganization and for its Member States. These may include obligations
governing the act of admission and secondary obligations that responsi-
bility would trigger for breach. Possible legal consequences of
responsibility for admission of States will be considered below.
II. OBLIGATIONS LIMITING THE DECISION TO
ADMIT TO MEMBERSHIP
A. Substantive or Primary Obligations Held
by International Organizations
The general law of responsibility assumes that the subjects of inter-
national law hold certain obligations. Human rights obligations have
been the main concern to date of writers considering the substantive ob-
ligations of international organizations and of the United Nations in
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particular." The content of the obligations however does not directly af-
fect the application of the rules of responsibility; the rules have been
developed in order to support their application regardless of the obliga-
tion in question. To consider responsibility in a particular case or field of
activity nevertheless entails specifying the primary, substantive obliga-
tion. For that reason, it is necessary for present purposes to consider
what obligations might relate to admitting a State to membership in the
Organization.
The search for possible obligations in this field leads one to examine
both general international law and the law of the Organization-though
the latter will have special significance. How exactly obligations under
the Charter relate to general international law may present a question of
some subtlety. The Charter, as a constitutive instrument, contains "rules
of the organization" for purposes of international responsibility, and
"[t]he question of the legal nature of the rules of the organization is con-
troversial."3 9 One view is that the internal rules, deriving as they do from
an international agreement, themselves form part of international law.n°
Another view, especially associated with European Community law, is
that the internal law of an organization "is separate from international
law and bears resemblance to the internal law of a State."4 ' The better
38. See, e.g., Chanaka Wickremasinghe & Guglielmo Verdirame, Responsibility and
Liability for Violations of Human Rights in the Course of UN Field Operations, in TORTURE AS
TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION 465, 474 (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (saying that the United Nations is not
exempt from international human rights law); see also Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani,
Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral
Development Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 177 (2005) (considering substantive obligations of
banks in view of putative principles of development, environmental protection, etc.).
39. ILC, Third Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, 18, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/553 (May 13, 2005) (prepared by Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter Third Report of
Special Rapporteur Gaja].
40. See id. (citing PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
576-77 (7th ed. 2002)) (quoting Letter from the Legal Counsel of the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO), to Legal Counsel, United Nations (Jan. 19, 2005) ("[T]he relations
between an international organization and its member States and between an international
organization and its agents should be more generally governed by international law, an inte-
gral part of which is the rules of the organization."); MATTEO DECLEVA, IL DIRITTO INTERNO
DELLE UNIONI INTERNAZIONALI (1962); G. Balladore Pallieri, Le Droit Interne des Organisa-
tions Internationales, 127 RECUEIL DES COURS 1(1969)).
41. Third Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 39, at 7 n.23. Pieter-Jan Kui-
jper thought that the "[ILC] draft may have great difficulty accommodating the special
position of the Community, in particular with respect to shared competence with its Member
States and in respect of mixed agreements." Pieter-Jan Kuijper, Remark, New World Order or
a World in Disorder?: Testing the Limits of International Law: The European Union's New
Ambitions, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 366, 369 (2005). For more on the distinctive position
of the European CommunityfEuropean Union, see Esa Paasivirta & Pieter Jan Kuijper, Does
One Size Fit All?: The European Community and the Responsibility of International Organiza-
tions, 2005 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 169; Stefan Talmon, Responsibility of International
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view is that the "legal nature of the rules of the organization" varies from
organization to organization, and also may vary among rules of different
42object and content. Those rules which are not strictly internal to the
international organization but, instead, are part of the international
agreement constituting the organization are among the rules relevant to
international responsibility.
International organizations, like States, are subject to diverse pri-
mary (that is, substantive) rules. It may be said that no two international
organizations and no two States have precisely the same sum total of
international rights and obligations. The rights and obligations of every
organization and of every State depend upon the international agree-
ments that they have entered into. Each organization and each State
holds its own portfolio of agreements, and, moreover, that portfolio is
subject to change as its bearer enters into new agreements, abrogates or
denounces old ones, and acquires new rights and obligations by way of
international dispute settlement.
There has been a tendency among States and international organiza-
tions when considering international responsibility to see the process of
determining the primary obligations of international organizations as
analytically distinct from those of States. To be sure, there is compara-
tively little international organization treaty practice,43 and so there is a
quantitative difference between analyzing the treaty obligations of States
and those of international organizations. There is also the centrality of
the constitutive instrument as the evidence and delimiter of the interna-
tional organization's competence; the competence of the State by
contrast is said to be plenary. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
comments on draft article 1 on Responsibility of International Organiza-
tions said as follows:
Since there is no existing body of international law on the matter
of what constituted a wrongful act of an international organiza-
tion and the evolution of such a body of law would largely rely
on general principles of law, the overriding legal effects of the
provisions of the charters of the international organizations,
which have been expressly agreed upon and are primary sources
of international law, must be made clear."
Organizations: Does the European Community Require Special Treatment?, in INTERNA-
TIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 405 (Maurizio
Ragazzi ed., 2005).
42. Third Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 39, 21, at 8.
43. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 38, at 195.
44. 2004 Comments, supra note 31, at 9.
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To say that "there is no existing body of international law on the
matter" is to take a skeptical view of the possible development of a
general international law of international organizations. Elsewhere too in
its comments on draft article 1, the IMF expressed doubt that other
"international norms" are applicable to international organizations. 45 In
the statement extracted immediately above, the IMF also seems to deny
that "general principles" themselves could apply to international
organizations or that general principles might influence the development
of a law of international organizations: in the IMF's view, the
constitutive instrument is "overriding." The question is, overriding of
what? It is inconceivable that the peremptory rules of international law
do not apply to international organizations ;4'6 and areas of the law having
general application, such as the customary law of treaties, at least in part,
must be relevant to all organizations. Other projects aiming to codify the
rules of responsibility with respect to international organizations, such as
the ILA's accountability study, have restricted themselves to quite
general expressions of shared principle.47 Even there the expressions
adopted, in certain instances, such as the ILA's proposed "principle of
institutional balance," refer back to the constitutive instrument of the
organization.48 The point generally is valid, that the constitutive
instrument is central to determining the obligations of an international
organization. Less clear is whether this renders the international
organization so different from the State as to require a very different
analytic approach when codifying the relation between primary rules and
international responsibility.
The ILC, in considering the primary obligations held by interna-
tional organizations for purposes of international responsibility, has
firmly adopted the approach it took with respect to States. Draft article
8(1), by extending the system of responsibility to all substantive rules
"regardless of [their] origin and character," embodies this approach. Yet,
evidently, not everyone has accepted the "trans-substantive" premise
with respect to organizations. The IMF, as suggested above, seems to
45. Id. at 9-10.
46. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth
Session, art. 23(3), U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (Oct. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 ILC Report]
("[P]eremptory norms also bind international organizations..."). Draft article 23 is a saving
clause with respect to peremptory norms, which remain binding, even in the face of circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness. The IMF itself later acknowledged the applicability of
peremptory norms. 2007 Comments, supra note 31, at 5.
47. ILA London Conference, supra note 13, at 878-83; 71 INT'L L. Ass'N REP. CONF.
164, 172-83 (2004) [hereinafter ILA Berlin Conference].
48. ILA London Conference, supra note 13, at 7; ILA Berlin Conference, supra note
47, at 179-80 (providing that "[t]he principle of institutional balance entails that organs of an
International Organisation cannot overstep the institutional restraints laid down in the con-
stituent instrument determining how they exercise their powers .... ").
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recommend turning the analysis toward the particular substantive obliga-
tions that each organization holds: "[W]hether there is a breach of an
international obligation by an international organization can only be de-
termined by reference to the rules of the organization (save in
exceptional cases involving peremptory norms. . . ),.49 Insofar as this
would call on the ILC to catalogue the substantive obligations of each
international organization (and these are myriad), the IMF's position
would reintroduce the matter of the primary obligation into the codified
rules of responsibility. Bringing the primary obligation into the drafting
project would upset the scheme that the ILC adopted after realizing that
to state all substantive obligations in international law is impractical. The
IMF is not the only participant that would counsel such a retrograde mo-
tion. China, in its comments before the Sixth Committee in 2007,
expressly called for a re-introduction of primary rules into the ILC's
consideration of the topic:
[T]he ILC should not lose sight of the study of primary rules of
international law in connection with responsibility of interna-
tional organizations. As breach of their international obligations
constitutes a precondition for incurring responsibility, a clear
definition on the rights and obligations of international organiza-
tions is essential for the codification to be based on a solid
foundation.50
Writers have suggested that the primary obligations are in fact a focal
point of the ILC's work on the responsibility of international organiza-
tions. Maja Smrkolj, for example, refers to "a contested topic of public
international law that has also been occupying the [ILC] under the notion
of responsibility of international organizations, namely human rights
obligations of international organizations."5' Though a debate may be
underway as to the primary obligations that apply to a given organization
or to organizations generally, it is a debate the ILC has been clear that it
should not enter.12 The primary obligations held by international organi-
zations are extremely diverse, their sources widely scattered, and, in
some instances, susceptible to differing interpretations. The difficulty in
49. 2007 Comments, supra note 31, at 8.
50. Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations,
Statement at the Sixth Committee of the 62nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly: Report
of the International Law Commission on Responsibility of International Organizations (Oct.
29, 2007), as reprinted in Zhu Lijiang, Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2007
(11), 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 735, 766 (2008).
51. Maja Smrkolj, International Institutions and Individualized Decision-Making: An
Example of UNHCR's Refugee Status Determination, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1779, 1792 (2008).
52. ILC, Report on the Fifty-Seventh Session, [ 207, draft art. 8(1), U.N. Doc. A/60/10
(Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 ILC Report].
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specifying the primary obligations for purposes of responsibility cer-
tainly does not obtain to a much lesser degree for organizations than for
States. The grounds for continuing the ILC's approach seem clear
enough.
It may be some time before codifiers, States, and international or-
ganizations agree as to how to deal with the primary obligations of the
international organization. Comment and practice will differ as to the
degree of specificity with which the primary obligations should be in-
corporated into the rules of responsibility; and so too will they differ as
to the relative weight to be accorded the constitutive instrument and rules
(or principles) of general application. However, that the positions
adopted in these matters so far are provisional by no means precludes an
inquiry into obligations relating to a particular field of international or-
ganization activity. It now falls to consider what obligations might exist
with respect to admission of States to the United Nations, both under the
Charter and under general international law.
B. Rules Relating to Admission to the United Nations
1. Article 4 of the Charter
Publicists, governments, and the ICJ, though they have not devel-
oped the idea to any great extent, have suggested that by casting a vote in
favor of admission of an applicant to the United Nations, the voting
Member State acts under certain obligations, or that the Organization as
an entity, in reaching a decision whether to admit an applicant to mem-
bership, itself acts under certain obligations. According to Comment (4)
to draft article 8 on Responsibility of International Organizations, "[f]or
an international organization most obligations are likely to arise from the
rules of the organization."53 Article 4, as part of the Charter, contains
"rules of the organization" as defined in the draft articles.54 Charter Arti-
cle 4 is an obvious starting point for considering possible obligations
respecting admission.
As previously noted, substantive admission criteria were largely
elided in practice after 1956. Yet the ICJ said in its Advisory Opinion on
Conditions of Admission55 that there are conditions that a State may not
consider when deciding how to cast its vote on an application for admis-
sion. Linking an affirmative vote on admission of one applicant to the
admission of another applicant-to give the main example that the Court
53. Id. at 1206.
54. ILC, Report on the Fifty-Sixth Session, 72, U.N. Doc. A/59/10 (Sept. 16, 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 ILC Report].
55. Conditions of Admission of State for Membership in United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57 (May 28).
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examined in 1948-the Charter prohibits. 6 To speak of prohibition is of
course to speak of obligation. The State casting its vote on admission, it
follows from the 1948 Advisory Opinion, is obliged to restrict itself to
the five criteria set out in Article 4(1).
It also is clear that the Security Council and General Assembly act
under Charter obligations as well, in particular the obligations set out in
paragraph 2 of Article 4. Whatever changes practice has effected upon
Article 4, paragraph 1, the mechanisms of admission set out in paragraph
2 have remained intact. Paragraph 2 makes a constitutional allocation of
competence concerning admission. A declaration by the General Assem-
bly that it had admitted an applicant even though the Security Council
had not recommended admission would be contra legem 7 An obligation
exists, then, to observe the constitutional law concerning mechanisms for
admission of States.
2. Obligations Relating to the Charter Guarantee
of International Peace and Security
Article 4 as seen above contains substantive criteria for admission
(paragraph 1) and a mechanism to control the process of admission
(paragraph 2). Other substantive provisions of the Charter relate directly
to the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and
security. The entire apparatus of Chapter VII (concerning action with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres-
sion), not to mention Chapter V (constituting the Security Council), are
among the central provisions in this field. The European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) has noted the centrality of the peace and security func-
tion to the purposes of the United Nations.58 States and the ICJ have
suggested that these provisions of the Charter give rise to substantive
obligations in the matter of admission.
The advisory proceedings of 1948 occasioned several statements
about the obligations of Member States when casting votes on admis-
sion. Yugoslavia took the position that States in the Security Council
possess an extensive discretionary power when voting on admission. 9
This power existed however not for its own sake, but rather for the pur-
pose of fulfilling the Security Council's function as principal organ for
56. Id. at 62-63.
57. Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3).
58. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, & Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01,
45 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE10, In 20, 148 (2007).
59. Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, 1948
I.C.J. Pleadings 82 (Apr. 23, 1948).
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maintaining international peace and security. According to Yugoslavia
(for which Milan Bartog appeared as representative),
le Conseil de S6curit6, prenant la d6cision d'admettre un ltat
candidat comme Membre, ne discute pas seulement la question
de savoir si le candidat a rempli les conditions fondamentales
sans lesquelles il ne peut pas 8tre admis dans l'Organisation,
mais 6galement la question de savoir si, en proc6dant de cette
fagon, on ne met pas en doute le maintien de la paix et de la s6-
curit6 internationale et de la collaboration internationale, prise
en g6n6rale.
Par cons6quent, il ne s'agit pas de consid6rer isol6ment si, du
point de vue juridique, un Etat peut ou ne peut pas 8tre Membre
de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. I1 s'agit 6galement
d'appr6cier les cons6quences futures de cet acte sur la stabilit6
internationale g6n6rale et sur la paix.6°
Here, Yugoslavia drew a connection between the Security Council's
peace and security role and its admission of new Member States. An ex-
isting Member State when casting its vote is obliged to consider the five
criteria relating to the applicant State ("les conditions fondamentales
sans lesquelles il ne peut pas &re admis dans l'Organisation"); and it is
also obliged to consider the function of the Security Council as guaran-
tor of peace and security ("on ne met pas en doute le maintien de la paix
et de la s6curit6 internationale"). That the role of the Security Council
respecting peace and security is obligatory cannot be doubted. The role
is certainly not elective; it belongs to the Council's obligations under the
Charter. It well may be the Council's main obligation. It has priority in
the Charter: the first clause of the first paragraph of Article 1 designates
maintenance of international peace and security as one of the "Purposes
of the United Nations." From this, it stands to reason that the five criteria
in Article 4(1) are not to be taken in isolation-which is to say that the
Security Council in all its actions must consider its duties concerning
peace and security. Broadly, then, two obligations exist relative to admis-
sion under the Charter: the obligation to restrict an affirmative vote to
those applicants fulfilling the five criteria of Article 4(1) and the obliga-
tion to restrict further an affirmative vote to those applicants whose
admission will not jeopardize international peace and security. Both ob-
ligations would apply to the individual Member State when casting its




Nations as a whole, for the final decision respecting an application for
admission is a decision, not of a Member State, but of the Organization.
Manfred Lachs, as representative for Poland, had a similar view. Ac-
cording to Lachs, "if one uses a right it should be used in the interest of
what it is meant for, in this case in the interest of peace and security."'
This was again in reference to the casting of a vote in the Security Coun-
cil on an application for admission. Albeit briefer than the Yugoslav
statement, the Polish statement also suggested the connection between a
decision to admit an applicant to membership and an obligation under
the law of the Charter relative to peace and security.
Judge Alvarez in his Individual Opinion in the Admission case
shared the view that admission of States is related to the duty of the
United Nations to protect international peace and security. "Cases may
arise," Judge Alvarez said, "in which the admission of a State is liable to
disturb the international situation .... Consequently, even if the condi-
tions of admission are fulfilled by an applicant, admission may be
refused."62 Judge Alvarez went on to say that such cases would be politi-
cal rather than legal and therefore would fall outside the jurisdiction of
the ICJ. This was to step back from saying that a legal obligation exists
to consider applications for admission in view of the implications of ad-
mission for international stability. To call the cases political was to
distance them from international law. The general point nevertheless re-
mains: admission has effects relative to peace and security in the
international system.
The dissenting judges in the Admission case talked about interna-
tional peace and security as well. According to Judges Basdevant,
Winiarski, McNair, and Read,
[u]pon the Security Council, whose duty it is to make the rec-
ommendation, there rests by the provisions of Article 24 of the
Charter "primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security"-a purpose inscribed in Article 1 of
the Charter as the first of the Purposes of the United Nations.
The admission of a new Member is pre-eminently a political act,
and a political act of the greatest importance.
63
Unlike the statements of Yugoslavia or Poland, the dissent here empha-
sized the obligation as one belonging to the Organization rather than to
the Member States. The dissenting judges nevertheless concurred that
peace and security is relevant to decisions concerning admission. The
61. Id. at 109.
62. Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, 1948
I.C.J. 57, 71.
63. Id. at 57, 85.
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dissenting judges, unlike Judge Alvarez, apparently saw the peace and
security function as a legal duty, not a political discretion.
The second advisory case concerning Article 4, Competence of the
General Assembly, also raised the question of how the decision to admit
an applicant might bear on general considerations of international peace
and security. Australia in particular had persistently expressed the view
in other U.N. organs that "the recommendation that the Security Council
could make on the admission of a new Member could concern only mat-
ters relating to security."' The Court rejected this interpretation of
Security Council powers as too narrow.6" This by no means, of course, is
to say that security somehow falls outside the Council's constitutional
competence. The Charter plainly defines the Security Council as the
chief organ concerned with "matters relating to security." Australia's
statement notes one of the undoubted functions of the Council-indeed,
the function so central to the Council as a constitutional organ of the
Charter that it is difficult to see how that function could be ignored in
any substantive decision that the Council takes, whether pertaining to
admission or to other subjects. As the decision to recommend a State for
admission is substantive, it stands to reason that the security function
must operate when the Security Council reaches the decision.
These were some of the early statements concerning peace and secu-
rity in the context of admission of new members. The treatment of the
application of Macedonia for membership in the early 1990s also sug-
gested a nexus between security and admission of new members. Greece
expressed concern that the title "Macedonia," if not qualified in some
way, implied a claim against the territorial integrity of Greece.66 The
United Nations admitted Macedonia under a special title-"the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM). 6' This gave rise to consid-
erable controversy 6  and protest from the admitted State.6 9 Yet
considerations of peace and security were hard to remove from any pol-
64. Statement of Australia, Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to
United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 33, 57 (Mar. 3, 1950).
65. Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 9, 10 (Mar. 3).
66. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Papaconstantinou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Greece, to the President of the U.N. Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25543 (Apr. 6, 1993).
67. S.C. Res. 817,1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/817 (Apr. 7, 1993).
68. See Case C-120/94, Comm'n v. Greece, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1513 (removal from the regis-
ter); Case C-120/94R, Comm'n v. Hellenic Republic, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3037 (denial of Article 186
interim measures); see also Implementation of Article 11, Paragraph I of the Interim Accord of
13 September 1995 (Fmr. Yugo. Republic of Maced. v. Greece) (Application) (Nov. 13, 2008),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/14879.pdf (last visited June 17, 2009).
69. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 17-21, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.98
(Apr. 8, 1993) (speech of President Gligorov upon admission of Macedonia to the United
Nations).
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icy respecting the Balkans in the 1990s. Macedonia had applied for ad-
mission to membership at a time when the Balkan region was embroiled
in civil wars. States and international organizations expressed concern
that the civil wars of the region might intensify, spread, and threaten se-
curity elsewhere. If there exists a situation in which admission merited
application of a cautionary rule relative to security, it was the admission
of new States in the Balkans in the 1990s.7°
The FYROM however has remained a special case. Since its inde-
pendence, additional States have come into existence in the Balkans and
the Security Council has not taken such precautionary steps with respect
to their admission. As of May 2009, the last State to be admitted to the
United Nations was Montenegro. Representatives in the General Assem-
bly noted at the time of admission that Montenegro had established its
independence from the Serbia-Montenegro union through democratic
processes and consent.7' The General Assembly President saw the proc-
ess by which Montenegro gained independence as "demonstrating its
adherence to democratic values and principles and the rule of law.
'"7"
Turkey "commend[ed] both the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of
Montenegro for the peaceful manner in which they concluded the disso-
lution of Serbia and Montenegro" and noted that the May 21, 2006
independence referendum had been carried out "in accordance with the
constitutional charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro." 7
Ireland praised the "democratic decision" taken "according to proce-
dures agreed with the Republic of Serbia. 74 The several references to
democracy and rule of law are interesting in their own right, for they
suggest that these principles are being further entrenched at international
level. The statements also reflect the concern of the United Nations and
its constituents that admission of a new State be carried out with a view
70. The position which writers generally have taken, however, has been that the legal
basis for the qualified title was doubtful. See, e.g., Matthew C.R. Craven, What's in a Name?
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of Statehood, 1995 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 199; Igor Janev, Legal Aspects of the Use of a Provisional Name for Macedonia in
the United Nations System, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (1999); Photini Pazartzis, La reconnais-
sance d'une ex-Republique Yougoslave: La question de l'ancienne Ripublique Yougoslave de
Macdoine (ARYM), 41 ANNUAIRE FRAN4AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 281 (1995); Michael
C. Wood, Participation of Former Yugoslav States in the United Nations and in Multilateral
Treaties, [1997] 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 231, 238 (1997); see also Roger O'Keefe, The
Admission to the United Nations of the Ex-Soviet and Ex-Yugoslav States, 2001 BALTIC YB.
INT'L L. 167, 177-79.
71. On behalf of the European Union, Mr. Pfanzelter (Austria) "commend[ed] the
peaceful and democratic way in which Montenegro gained its independence." U.N. GAOR,
60th Sess., 91st plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.91 (June 28, 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 8.
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to peace and security. If Montenegro had established its independence
without consulting with or gaining consent from the union of which it
had been part, then this would have introduced a further irritant to Bal-
kan politics. In such a situation, affirmation of Montenegro's
independence may have merited delay. The manner in which Montene-
gro in fact established its independence, however, raised no concerns
relative to peace and security.
The statements noted above are the extent of practice arising out of
the admission of Montenegro. The case offers no further evidence that
peace and security are becoming entrenched as a consideration relevant
to applications for admission. The General Assembly adopted the resolu-
tion admitting Montenegro by acclamation.75 The antecedent Security
Council Presidential Statement of June 22, 2006 was pro forma,76 as was
the Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members.77 In
light of the recent history of the region to which Montenegro belongs, it
is noteworthy that the Security Council Committee on the Admission of
New Members saw no need to indicate on the record that it had consid-
ered the implications for peace and security entailed by the creation of
another State. The process by which Montenegro established its inde-
pendence was exemplary; if concerns relating to the regional
environment had arisen, perhaps the absence of any serious local politi-
cal problems assuaged them.
To date, Kosovo has not presented an application for admission to
the United Nations. States objecting to Kosovo's declaration of inde-
pendence referred to supposed threats to peace and stability." The same
States likely would object in similar terms to the Kosovar application for
admission, should one be made. No question of admission arises where
no entity seeks to be admitted.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions from the practice to date. A
principle may exist that, when the United Nations takes a decision on
admitting a new member, it should do so with a view to the peace and
security implications of the decision. Practice does not give strong indi-
75. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Approves Admission of
Montenegro to United Nations, Increasing Number of Member States to 192, U.N. Doc.
GA/10479 (June 28, 2006).
76. See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5473d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/27 (June 22, 2006).
77. See U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. on Admission of New Members, Montenegro's
Admission to the U.N., U.N. Doc. S/2006/425 (June 21, 2006).
78. See, e.g., Vuk Jeremid, Op-Ed., One Nation, Indivisible, N.Y. "IMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at
A25 (speaking as Foreign Minister of Serbia). But see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.
Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http:I/
www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/February/20080218144244dmslahrellekO.9832117.
html (last visited June 1, 2009).
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cations that the United Nations or its Member States accept this as
obligatory.
3. Obligations Under General International Law
That international organizations are not parties to most treaties
presents a glaring contradiction to the professed principle of re-
sponsibility of international organizations under international
law. If they are not bound by most treaties, what are the applica-
ble laws regulating the conduct of international organizations?
What remains is customary international law, which creates ob-
ligations for international organizations in addition to those they
voluntarily assume under international treaty law. International
organizations are, as stated by the ICJ in the WHO case, "bound
by any obligations incumbent upon them" under customary in-
ternational law.79
Whether or not a "contradiction" arises from the limited treaty practice
of organizations, it is certainly right to say that customary international
law-that is, general international law-applies to international organi-
zations. Certain obligations under general international law would seem
to be relevant to the admission of an applicant to the United Nations.
International law rejects the creation of a State as a means to effec-
tuate a policy that violates ajus cogens rule. The main illustration of the
rule is found in international treatment of Apartheid South Africa's pol-
icy of declaring certain parts of its territory "independent" Homelands.8"
The Homelands were putative States separated from South Africa by
unilateral South African declarations, and their purpose was not to se-
cure the rights of the Homeland inhabitants but, rather, to strengthen
Apartheid.8' The unlawfulness of Apartheid as a political system was
well-established 2 No State, except South Africa, recognized the Home-
lands as States. 3 International law similarly rejects that a putative State
may exist otherwise to shield its parent from legal responsibility. For
example, the inhabitants of a territory for which a State has responsibil-
ity under international law may look to the State for redress, even where
the State claims that the territory constitutes another State. The main
79. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 38, at 195 (quoting Interpretation of Agreement of
25 March 1951 Between WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90e).
80. JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 98-108 (1987).
81. Id.; see also G.A. Res. 34/93A, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/93 (Dec. 12, 1979); G.A.
Res. 34/93G, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/93 (Dec. 12, 1979).
82. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apar-
theid art. I, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
83. DUGARD, supra note 80, at 100.
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cases have been secessionist entities supported by foreign military inter-
vention, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 4 and
Gagauzia. 85 The South African Homelands, despite the ambition of their
patron, never gained admission to the United Nations. The secessionist
entities in Cyprus, Moldova, and Georgia are not U.N. members and
would not be admitted under present circumstances. The United Nations
more generally will reject the putative creation of a State in breach of
self-determination, and States may express objections to admission in
terms of self-determination as well. The USSR, for example, objected to
the dissolution of the Strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a
measure resulting in the emergence of several new States. The Territory,
said the USSR, had a right to remain a single entity and to gain inde-
pendence as such; the emergence of several States from the Territory, the
Soviets said, violated the right to self-determination of the whole.86 The
USSR expressed this objection when it came time to consider the admis-
sion of these States to U.N. membership.87 Democratic processes in the
territory, however, affirmed the will of the inhabitants to establish several
88new States. No veto was cast, and the United Nations admitted Palau,
the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands in the nor-
mal way."
The decolonization provisions of the Charter also may be relevant to
responsibility for admission." The Charter obliges the administering
84 Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., [ 13-15 (quoting Loizidou v. Turkey,
App. No. 15318/89, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., I 16-17).
85. See Ila~cu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., B 111-36.
86. MASAHIRO IGARASHI, ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-17
(2002).
87. CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 337 (noting the Soviet protest before the Trusteeship
Council).
88. IGARASHI, supra note 86, at 189.
89. S.C. Res. 963, U.N. Doc. S/RES/963 (Aug. 9, 1991) (Palau); S.C. Res. 703, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/703 (Aug. 9, 1991) (Federal States of Micronesia); S.C. Res. 704, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/704 (Aug. 9, 1991) (Marshall Islands). The General Assembly adopted the resolutions
on admission without vote. Admission of the Republic of Palau to Membership in the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 49/63, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 89th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/63
(Dec. 15, 1994) (Palau); Admission of the Federated States of Micronesia to Membership in
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/2, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/2 (Sept. 17, 1991); Admission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to Member-
ship in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/3, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/3 (Sept. 17, 1991).
90. For an analysis of the Charter and decolonization generally, see Ulrich Fastenrath,
Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1089-97 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002); Rudolf Geiger, The
Trusteeship Council, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 1129, 1129-38;
Dietrich Rauschning, International Trusteeship System, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, supra, at 1117, 1117-28; see also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 71-89 (1995); DUGARD, supra note 80, at 63-70; ANDRdS
RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF
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power to "develop self-government" in colonial territories for which it is
responsible. 9' The General Assembly eventually said that the administer-
ing power's obligation includes implementing the choice of final
disposition, which the people of the colonial territory may choose, in-
cluding independence as a new State . Admission perhaps has some
relation to this, for to deny the new State the advantages of membership
would be to impede the fuller political consolidation that self-
government would seem to entail. More will be said about decoloniza-
tion below, in connection with reparation.
III. BREACH AND THE PROBLEM OF THE INJURED PARTY
Assuming that a relevant obligation exists, responsibility may arise
where breach of that obligation occurs. Breach entails an injured party.
In many situations, identifying the injured party is straightforward. A
diplomat is detained and the archives of the embassy impounded in
breach of Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations;93 the conduct is an injury to the sending State.94 A foreign in-
vestor is stripped of regulatory permission to carry out its intended
business in breach of the fair and equitable treatment clause of a bilateral
investment treaty between the State of the investor's nationality and the
host State; assuming that the treaty contains a clause giving the investor
a right to arbitrate against the host State, the injury may be treated as an
injury to the investor.95 In some situations, however, questions may arise
as to what party the breach has injured. The present section will consider
the relation between breach and obligation; and the question of what en-
tity precisely might be injured by a breach of obligations concerning
admission of States.
UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 53-94 (1973); Jost Delbruck, Selbstbestimmung und Dekolonisa-
tion, in DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN UND DIE MITARBEIT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
69, 73-99 (Ulrich Scheuner & Beate Lindemann eds., 1973); Thomas D. Grant, Extending
Decolonization: How the United Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 9, 26-33 (1999).
91. U.N. Charter art. 73.
92. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, princ. VI, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 948th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/4684/Annex (Dec. 15, 1960).
93. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 26-27, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
94. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 32 (May 24).
95. See, e.g., Tdcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 166 (2003). The English Court of Appeal has made
clear that the private party (the investor) is indeed the injured party: Occidental Exploration &
Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1116, [16] (Eng.).
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A. Obligations Owed, Breaches Committed
Draft article 8 on Responsibility of International Organizations pro-
vides as follows:
EXISTENCE OF A BREACH OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
1. There is a breach of an international obligation by an interna-
tional organization when an act of that international
organization is not in conformity with what is required of it
by that obligation, regardless of its origin and character.
2. Paragraph 1 also applies to the breach of an obligation under
international law established by a rule of the international or-
ganization.96
As previously noted, the phrase "regardless of its origin and character" is
significant, for it means that the articles apply to all substantive rules; the
international law of responsibility is not limited to substantive rules
originating in particular instruments or sources. Moreover, the estab-
lished rules of the international organization include its constitutive
instrument. Obligations arising under the U.N. Charter therefore are ob-
ligations a breach of which is a breach for purposes of responsibility.
Acts that may constitute breaches include both actions and omissions.97
It was, for example, omissions that concerned States at the time of the
logjam, when they suggested that declining to admit a qualified State
might constitute a breach of the Charter.98
Where an obligation exists, the possibility exists of its breach. The
concepts of obligation and breach are connected in this way. The draft
articles, though they explicate the concept of breach in terms of its dura-
tion, continuing character, etc., 9 do not say how to analyze evidence so
as to determine whether it proves the existence of a breach. In actual dis-
putes, of course, parties will contest evidence concerning an action or
omission, so whether particular evidence leads to the determination that
an act was "not in conformity with what is required ... by [an] obliga-
tion" often will be a question requiring careful judgment.o Parties also
96. 2005 ILC Report, supra note 52, at 82.
97. Id. draft art. 11, at 83.
98. For a summary of the main statements to this effect, see Report of the Special
Committee on Admission of New Members, U.N. GAOR 8th Sess., Annex 7, 8, U.N. Doc.
A/2400 (June 25, 1953).
99. 2005 ILC Report, supra note 52, draft articles 8-11, at 82-83.
100. E.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, H 202-24 (Feb. 26) (consider-
ing the burden of proof, standard of proof, and methods of proof applicable to determining the
facts); id., IT 225-470 (examining the evidence in detail).
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will contest the content of a putative obligation. ° But if the necessary
facts are established and an obligation is specified, then identifying a
given act as breaching the obligation (or not) is logically straightforward.
For purposes of the secondary responsibility to make reparation,
however, the matter of breach will remain largely abstract if no injured
party can be identified. A question therefore resides in the interstices of
the rules concerning breach: one must ask against what party the breach
has been committed. Entailed in the matter of breach is thus also the
matter of obligation, for another way of asking against whom the breach
has been committed is to ask to whom the obligation breached was
owed. The Commentary to draft article 8 notes that "[a]n international
obligation may be owed by an international organization to the interna-
tional community as a whole, one or several States, whether members or
non-members, another international organization or other international
organizations and any other subject of international law."' 02 With these
terms in mind, one can consider the question against what entity or enti-
ties might a breach be committed respecting admission of States?
B. The Injured Party
1. The Newly Admitted State?
Many States at the time of their admission to the United Nations are
well-established, and the mechanisms of public order within their juris-
diction operate fully and reliably. Others are new States. Some new
States have rapidly consolidated their international status and also have
established stable governments discharging the main tasks of internal
order. Others have not. A number of new States have lacked governments
with the capacity to maintain internal order and have been undermined
by secessionist activity or other unrest. The Congo and Bosnia were sali-
ent examples. 0 3 If the creation of such States has resulted in injury and
the practice of the United Nations in the matter of admission encouraged
101. For example, the United States and Mexico contested the meaning of "without
delay" for purposes of Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings 78-104 (Nov. 3, 2003); Memorial of Mexico, Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings 70-86 (June 20, 2003).
102. 2005 ILC Report, supra note 52, 206. Guiding Principle 6 applicable to unilateral
declarations of States includes very similar terms: an obligation created by unilateral act may
be owed to an international organization, a State or States, or the international community as a
whole. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, at 370, 376.
103. For a summary of the accession to independence of the Congo and attendant politi-
cal turbulence, see Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
102-06 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of Judge Bula-Bula). On Bosnia, see Application of Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.
& Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 232 (Feb. 26).
Summer 2009] 1121
Michigan Journal of International Law
their creation, then perhaps the admitted State is an injured party. As will
be seen later in this Article, however, to make such a connection between
admission, State creation, and injury may present a problem of causa-
tion. '°
Even if in principle it might be possible to establish responsibility of
the United Nations or of the Member States toward the admitted State,
this does not mean that in any actual case of admission responsibility
necessarily would be established: no State has been admitted to the
United Nations without asking to be.'05 Article 17, the first draft article
under the heading Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, says as fol-
lows: "Valid consent by a State or an international organization to the
commission of a given act by another international organization pre-
cludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to that State or the former
organization to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that
consent."' °6
The application of a State for admission to membership in the
United Nations, duly adopted and duly presented, surely constitutes
"[v]alid consent" on the part of the State applying. The formality associ-
ated with the U.N. admission procedure would seem all but to preclude
evidentiary dispute.'07 The application not only constitutes consent; it is a
step without which the act cannot be performed. As a "given act," admit-
ting a State to the United Nations would be extremely hard to
characterize as not "within the limits" of the request for admission. The
United Nations admits; and the State is admitted. The act of admission
consists in little more---even as its effects may consist in considerably
more. The admitted State by the terms of draft article 17 would appear to
have consented to admission. This would preclude admission as a
wrongful act toward the admitted State.
104. See infra Part VI (discussing how proximate the act of admission might have to be
to an injury for the act to constitute a breach for purposes of international responsibility).
105. The unusual case of the "reemergence" of Syria from the United Arab Republic is
no exception. The legal characterization for the transactions in question is disputed, but Syria
did not protest against its reintegration under separate title into the United Nations; and,
though it made no formal application, Syria almost certainly asked before it was re-seated on
October 13, 1961, even if it directed its request as a housekeeping matter to the administrative
officers of the General Assembly and, perhaps, outside formal channels. On the Syrian matter,
see Richard Young, Editorial Comment, The State of Syria: Old or New? 56 AM. J. INT'L L.
482, 483 (1962). Belorussia and Ukraine were original members and thus not "admitted"
under Article 4. See Growth in the United Nations Membership, http://www.un.org/
members/growth.shtml#1940 (last visited July 7, 2009). Their membership is provided for
under U.N. Charter art. 3.
106. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, 91, at 264.
107. Hypothetically, a case could arise of a government whose credentials to represent
the State are doubted, and applies for U.N. membership in the name of that State; in practice,
however, this case has not yet arisen.
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This is a significant position, for it would preclude a category that
might otherwise be the main category likely to invoke responsibility for
admission.
2. Existing Member States of the Organization?
"It should not be controversial that an international organization in-
curs international responsibility for the breach of an obligation under
international law that it may have towards its member States."'' 8 This
assertion, however, must be qualified. Circumstances precluding wrong-
fulness may prevent responsibility from attaching for an otherwise
wrongful act. And considerations of the constitutional character of the
United Nations also come into play when considering the effect of the
admission of a new member. Member States may be grouped in two
categories when considering admission: those that voted in favor of ad-
mission and those that did not.
a. States Voting in Favor of Admission
Member States that voted in favor of admission, like the admitted
State, consented to the act, so any wrongfulness that might be estab-
lished, at least toward those Member States in their capacity as members,
would be precluded on the same grounds.
b. States Not Voting in Favor of Admission
Member States that dissented or abstained perhaps present a distinct
situation. The record of dissent to admission is thin, partly because the
explanations for votes given in the Security Council and General Assem-
bly seldom have been particularly detailed. In the few instances in which
States have articulated why they would not vote for admission, a recur-
ring objection has been that the applicant was not a State. '°9 Dissentients
also, if in considerably fewer cases, have said that the admitted State did
not comply with Charter obligations, such as commitments to human
rights."0 Yet dissent against a decision reached by the United Nations'
constitutional mechanisms does not result in the dissentients having a
different set of legal relations to the United Nations from members of the
108. ILC, Fifth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, 1 10, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/583 (May 2, 2007) (prepared by Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter Fifth Report of Special
Rapporteur Gaja].
109. Two such cases were Kuwait and Mauritania. See U.N. SCOR 16th Sess., 984th
mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.984 (Nov. 30, 1961) (remarks of Mr. Pachachi of Iraq regarding
Kuwait); U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 911th mtg. 194, U.N. Doc. S/PV.911 (Dec. 3, 1960) (re-
marks of Mr. Boucetta of Morocco regarding Mauritania).
110. See U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1972nd mtg. at 13-14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1971 (Nov. 15,
1976) (remarks by Mr. Scranton of the United States respecting Vietnam).
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majority. To amend the Charter, to note the main example, is to amend it
for all members. Admission of a State to the United Nations is similar in
its general effect on the membership. Admission is a constitutive act in
the sense that it alters the make-up of the Organization. To be sure, ad-
mission does not bind Member States to recognize the admitted State or
to adopt any other particular diplomatic posture toward it; but existing
Member States have no right to deny that the newly admitted State is a
member. The occasional statement by certain States for example, that
they do not accept Israel as a U.N. Member State, is clearly without
Charter basis.
3. The International Community as a Whole
Comment (3) to draft article 8 also lists as an entity to which an in-
ternational obligation may be owed (and thus against which a breach
committed) "the international community as a whole."" The proposition
is by now well-established that erga omnes obligations exist in interna-
tional law-that is to say, obligations owed not to one party alone but to
the community subject to the legal system. Though the idea is older,"2 its
modem appearance is associated with the following well-known state-
ment of the ICJ in Barcelona Traction:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obliga-
tions of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplo-
matic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection;
they are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary interna-
tional law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding
111. 2005 ILC Report, supra note 52, 206, at 87.
112. For example, the Concert of Europe acted as if it held certain rights and obligations
concerning general public order. See CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF
THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d rev. ed. 2005). The Concert
was not an international organization (though it may have been a progenitor of international
organizations. See id. Its legal interest in adopting a settlement in 1815 (and in maintaining the
settlement adopted) probably did not include an articulated interest in collective security, but
that interest may otherwise be likened to the interest which gives "the international commu-
nity as a whole" rights and obligations with respect to certain aspects of public order today.




rights of protection have entered into the body of general inter-
national law (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character."1
3
Barcelona Traction concerned investment protection and, as such, the
Court's disquisition on obligations "towards the international community
as a whole" was for purposes of contrast, indeed obiter dictum." 4 It is
nevertheless a significant statement about legal rights in the international
system.
a. The Scope and Content of Erga Omnes Obligations
Two questions of the scope and content of erga omnes obligations
are relevant to the question of whether an obligation concerning admis-
sion of States may be owed to the international community as a whole.
First, though erga omnes obligations plainly involve such matters as
genocide and slavery, are there erga omnes obligations involving matters
of lesser magnitude? And second, though there are erga omnes obliga-
tions where the injured party is a particular State or other person and, by
construction, the international community as a whole is said to be in-
jured, is it possible for the international community as a whole to be
directly injured?
The obligation to observe certain, at least basic, human rights has
an erga omnes character: "[T]he importance of the rights" discussed in
Barcelona Traction is such that "all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection" and, it is said to follow,"5 the special char-
acter of the rights results in the jurisdiction of the State, which is
otherwise exclusive, being qualified. While erga omnes obligations
include "obligations generally aim[ed] at regulating the internal behav-
ior of a state, such as in the field of human rights,"" 6 they certainly
include more. For example, the ICJ in the passage in Barcelona Trac-
tion concerning erga omnes obligations includes among them the
prohibition against aggression. The Court later would add to this the
113. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
114. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6
HARV. L. REV. 203, 239 (2006); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 318 (2006) (referring to it as dicta).
115. E.g., Rosanne van Alebeek, The Pinochet Case: International Human Rights Law
on Trial, 2000 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 34.
116. Shelton, supra note 114, at 318.
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obligation to respect the self-determination of peoples. "7 While depriva-
tion of self-determination and conduct of aggressive war have serious
consequences within the borders of a given State, these breaches of obli-
gation also concern international society at large. Maintenance of
general public order would seem to have a certain "importance," and at
least as clearly as human rights, is a material interest of all States. That
States created the United Nations as an institution to guarantee general
public order, and made that function primary among its tasks, suggests
the intention to establish a corresponding legal interest.
The fourth preambular paragraph of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome Statute)"' refers to the need to punish the "most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole."
Article 5, which sets out the crimes over which the Court has jurisdic-
tion, refers to those crimes in the same terms.' The four crimes which
Article 5, paragraph 1 lists as the "most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole" are the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. These are
crimes resulting from a breach of peremptory norms. Considering the
terms of the Rome Statute and the guidance of the Court, one might ask
whether erga omnes obligations are only those of such magnitude. It is
true that clear cases of obligations owed to all are obligations to respect
certain imprescriptable rules of international law. The notions of "uni-
versal crimes" and "universal jurisdiction" contain a similar relation.
12 0
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
has identified crimes that "must be prosecuted and punished by all
States" as "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions. 121
Yet -certain rules that are subject to the will of States Parties-i.e.,
rules that are capable of reformulation or derogation-have erga omnes
effect as well. That erga omnes obligations and jus cogens rules are not
identical has been noted, for example by Alexander Orakhelashvili:
117. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 172 (July 9); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90,
102 (June 30).
118. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002
[hereinafter ICC Rome Statute].
119. Id. at 1003--04 ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole...").
120. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J.
INT'L L. 60, 71 (1952); Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
38, 48-51 (1947); Quincy Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 280-83 (1945). For
critical observations on universal jurisdiction, see Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume); see
also id. at 78 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
121. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgment, 308 (Nov. 16, 1998) (em-
phasis in original).
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It appears that jus cogens and obligations erga omnes are but
two sides of the same coin, as they both relate to the concern of
all States. Arguably, while obligations erga omnes follow from
peremptory norms, the reverse is not always true. There can be
erga omnes obligations not deriving from jus cogens, such as the
right of passage in an international strait. 
2
Another example is the definition of international land and maritime
frontiers: international law does not preclude a change in frontier (so
long as the change takes place on the basis of consent), and the effects of
a change lawfully instituted are opposable against all.'23 It nevertheless is
clear that a consensual change to an international boundary is not the
same as targeted killings of an ethnic group.
The second question is whether a breach, in order to be a breach to
which the international community as a whole has a right to respond,
necessarily entails conduct directed against individuals or States. The
main cases of breaches that concern the international community as a
whole are cases of breaches committed against a State or an individual.
For example, a State is attacked or an individual is enslaved. The com-
munity's interest is a legal construction, for the party directly injured is
only a constituent of the community, not the community itself. The ques-
tion is whether a breach can "concern the international community as a
whole" in the more direct sense that the main (or only) identifiable vic-
tim of the breach is the community itself. It is not clearly an a fortiori
case that, if the community can proceed in response to a breach consist-
ing of conduct which directly injures individuals or States, it can proceed
in response to a breach where the community is the only or the primary
victim. For one thing, the breach that directly affects individuals or
States is more likely to instigate institutional responses than the breach
that lacks a clear target; the international community as a whole does not
124act except through institutions. For another, the international commu-
nity's institutions, when they do act, may well act as agents to which
States have delegated authority in response to an attack on the States'
particular interests. It does not necessarily follow that the institutions
122. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268-
69 (2006).
123. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2001 I.C.J.
652, 655 (Oct. 23) (separate opinion of Judge Franck) (application by the Philippines for per-
mission to intervene).
124. See the observation of the Commission of the European Union in connection with
the ILC draft articles: "[T]he international community as a whole cannot act on its own lack-
ing centralized institutions... " ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations:
Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/593 (Mar. 31, 2008).
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have authority to act without the delegation. Gaja notes in the Sixth Re-
port that the entitlement of an international organization to invoke
responsibility for a breach of an obligation to the international commu-
nity "would not necessarily depend on the fact that the international
organization is a member of the international community. It could be
seen as delegated by the States that are members of the organization."'25
If, for the international community to act, the breach must in the first
instance affect a State or individual, however, then a gap exists in the
regime. Certain breaches usually considered breaches of erga omnes ob-
ligations-for example, breaches of the right to self-determination-are
not only, or even mainly, matters of individual rights or the rights of
States. Obligations concerning protection of the natural environment
perhaps furnish another example of obligations, the breach of which is
not against individuals or States, but against the community as a whole
2 6
(though on the whole environmental damage still is treated as a matter
between States).'" An obligation to protect world cultural heritage is also
a possible example of a situation in which the individual or State interest
is secondary to that of the community.2 1 Whether the community is act-
ing in response to a breach directly affecting itself or, instead, affecting
particular constituents, a problem in both cases will be to identify a
mechanism that can act on behalf of the community. The United Nations
is the obvious mechanism, and so the relation between the United Na-
tions and the community merits some consideration.
b. The Relation Between the United Nations and the
International Community as a Whole
Karel Wellens says that "global civil society is the natural constitu-
ency to which [international organizations] are accountable.' ' 29 If
Wellens is right, then it would be surprising, even illogical, if interna-
tional organizations could not owe that society obligations. The Draft
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations assume that an
125. ILC, Sixth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, 37, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/597 (Apr. 1, 2008) (prepared by Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter Sixth Report of Special
Rapporteur Gaja].
126. For environmental protection being a possible erga omnes obligation, see Gab~ik-
ovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of
Judge Weeramantry). See also the arbitral cases noted by CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING
OBLIGATIONS Erga Omnes IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 n.34 (2005). For a discussion about
respecting the relation between environmental interests and erga omnes obligations, see XUE
HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 237-50 (2003).
127. E.g., 2001 ILC Report, supra note 7, at 370-77.
128. ROGER O'KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT
(2006).
129. Karel Wellens, Accountability of International Organizations: Some Salient Fea-
tures, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 241,245 (2003).
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international organization can indeed owe obligations to society, or at
least to "the international community as a whole." Draft article 51, for
example ("[i]nvocation of responsibility by an entity other than an in-
jured State or international organization"), under paragraph 2, provides
that "[a]ny State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the re-
sponsibility of an international organization ... if the obligation
breached is owed to the international community as a whole.""'3 Draft
article 22, paragraph l(a), by way of exception, permits an organization
to invoke necessity as a ground precluding wrongfulness, where the oth-
erwise wrongful act "[i]s the only means for the organization to
safeguard against a grave and imminent peril an essential interest of the
international community as a whole when the organization has, in accor-
dance with international law, the function to protect that interest"' 3 As
noted, the United Nations clearly has the function to protect "that inter-
e st."'
32
As an organization that now includes nearly all States, the United
Nations also has structural characteristics that place it in special relation
to the international community. What, however, precisely is that rela-
tion? If the position were taken that the United Nations is identical to the
community, then the conceptual problem arises of an entity owing itself
a legal obligation; such a conception would be rather strained, if not il-
logical. The problem is avoided by recognizing, as the ILC at least
implicitly did, that the United Nations and the community are distinct
formations. Several considerations distinguish them.
First, the international community preceded the United Nations.
Though States and other international actors were not necessarily
thought of as constituting a "community" before the latter half of the
twentieth century, 33 the United Nations did not make its appearance
against a backdrop of complete normative chaos. The international
system may have been significantly underdeveloped, but it was not non-
existent. A second, and related distinction, is that the international
community, even as it has become more developed over recent decades,
130. Sixth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 125, 40.
131. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, 91, at 272 (emphasis added); see also id. at 274
(comment (4) to draft article 22).
132. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, & Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01,
45 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE10, 20, 148 (2007). Writers, too, have considered obligations of the
United Nations to the international community. See, e.g., lain Scobbie, Unchart(er)ed Waters?
Consequences of the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the Responsibility of the UN for Palestine, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 941, 959-61 (2005).
133. The nineteenth century tendency was to describe a society of European States,
existing under certain rules inter se, but in distinction against other States and polities. ED-
WARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM, AND ORDER IN
WORLD POLITICS 114 (2002).
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lacks institutional form. The United Nations by contrast is an institution
and, arguably, the principal organized expression of the international
community.'34 But it remains a limited expression, which suggests a third
distinction: the United Nations is an organization of States. It has come
to be an organization of nearly all States-but not necessarily all.
According to the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory Opinion,
[a]s to non-member States, although not bound by Articles 24
and 25 of the Charter, they have been called upon.. . to give as-
sistance in the action which has been taken by the United
Nations with regard to Namibia. In the view of the Court, the
termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality
of South Africa's presence in Namibia are opposable to all States
in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a situation
which is maintained in violation of international law....35
Erga omnes rules are opposable to all States, non-member States and
Member States alike. The United Nations and the community of States,
though overlapping considerably, are not necessarily coterminous.
And even if the United Nations comprised all States and continued
to do so by way of a constitutional guarantee, the United Nations still
would not be the same as the international community as a whole, for
the community encompasses considerably more than States. Individu-
als insofar as they possess aspects of international legal personality are
part of the community.' 36 International organizations, though many of
them are involved directly or indirectly in the U.N. system, 37 are not all
part of the United Nations-but they certainly are part of the interna-
tional community. Entities proximate to States and the various non-
State corporate formations, such as religions, transnational interest
groups, non-governmental organizations, and the like, too, at least for
certain purposes are constituents of the international community. The
extensive involvement of non-governmental organizations in drafting
134. Judge Bustamante y Rivero called the League of Nations "the first organized ex-
pression of the international community" South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S.
Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 351 (Dec. 21) (separate opinion of Judge Bustamante). Writers have
applied the phrase to the United Nations. See, e.g., Toufayan, supra note 16, at 248-49.
135. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Port. v. Austl.),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 56 (June 21).
136. See, e.g., LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27).
137. And some simultaneously are part of the U.N. system and another regional sys-
tem--e.g., the Pan American Health Organization. 2004 Comments, supra note 31, at 27-28
(comments by the WHO).
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recent multilateral conventions illustrates their relevance as community
members.131
As such, the United Nations itself is not the international commu-
nity, but it may well be the most nearly perfect expression of that
community in institutional form (however imperfect it may remain).
Universality, as a principle embedded in post-1945 practice, has resulted
in nearly full participation by States, and States are still the most signifi-
cant actors in the international community. Even if full universality of
state membership in the United Nations were achieved and maintained,
and even if States were the sole actors, rather than merely the main ac-
tors, the United Nations would remain an institutional mechanism for
purposes of giving expression to the international community; it still
would not be the same thing as the community itself. In the Draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), the ILC
said that attacks against U.N. personnel "constitute violent crimes of
exceptionally serious gravity which have serious consequences not only
for the victims, but also for the international community.' ' 39 The United
Nations was not equated with the international community: U.N. per-
sonnel are "persons who represent the international community." '40 A
duty to the "international community as a whole" very much may in-
volve the United Nations, for the United Nations is specially suited as an
institution to represent the community's interests. It follows from its dis-
tinctness from the community and from its assigned functions that the
United Nations itself may owe obligations to the community.
IV. ATTRIBUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
As noted in Part I above, international responsibility arises where the
law attributes a breach of an obligation to a particular party. Even where
responsibility arises, however, there remains the matter of holding the
responsible party accountable. The mechanisms for doing so at the inter-
national level are not highly developed in all fields. Both the ILC and
writers have acknowledged the underdevelopment of mechanisms of ac-
countability as an obstacle to implementing a system of responsibility of
international organizations. 14' The present section considers attribution
138. For example, non-governmental organization participation was particularly exten-
sive in the negotiations leading to adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.
139. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth
Session, 50, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (Jan. 1, 1996).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., Karel Wellens, Fragmentation of International Law and Establishing an
Accountability Regime for International Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing
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and accountability relative to the question of responsibility for admission
of States.
ARSIWA Article 57 reserves the thorny issue of attribution of the
conduct of an international organization to its Member States. The sav-
ing clause therein indicates that the Articles are "without prejudice to
any question of the responsibility under international law of an interna-
tional organization, or of any State for the conduct of an international
organization" The first reservation, excluding international organiza-
tions, has a clear place in ARSIWA: the Articles are articles of state
responsibility. The second reservation, however, raises a question. If
ARSIWA addresses state responsibility, why should it not address state
responsibility in the framework of an international organization?
ARSIWA implicitly admits the difficulty of the relation of the responsi-
bility of the organization to that of its members. The ILC noted the
difficulty in its Commentary
42
It is well-established that international organizations are not above
the law. At the very least, the internal law of an organization limits its
conduct. According to the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, "[t]he Security
Council is an organ of an international organization, established by a
treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization.
The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limita-
tions... *, 14 3 International law governs the conduct of the organization as
well. Indeed, by the commonly received definitions, an international or-
ganization is an entity created under international law and subject to its
terms. G. G. Fitzmaurice, for example, acknowledged the international
law basis of international organizations in the definition he proposed,
and which E1-Erian later accepted as "gather[ing] all the essential ele-
ments" According to Fitzmaurice, "[t]he term 'international
organization' means a collectivity of States established by treaty, with a
constitution and common organs, having a personality distinct from that
the Gap, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1159, 1161 (2004) (noting the ILC's initial work on the ac-
countability problem); see also Gerhard Hafner, Accountability of International
Organizations, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 236, 236-40 (2003) (defining "accountability"
and comparing it to responsibility); William E. Holder, International Organizations: Account-
ability and Responsibility, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 231, 233 (2003) (noting internal
compliance mechanisms but limited external accountability of the World Bank and IMF).
142. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 105 (James Crawford ed., 2002) [hereinafter ILC
COMMENTARIES].
143. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 28 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 42 (1996).
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of its member-States, and being a subject of international law with
treaty-making capacity.'
144
Therefore the problem is not one of general applicability of interna-
tional law to the international organization. Practice supports that an
international organization holds obligations under international law. The
Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, issued approximately a cen-
tury after the first appearance of international organizations in the
modern sense, said that an international organization may possess legal
personality and oppose rights against a State. 145 It took another fifty years
for a definitive statement that an international organization may hold
obligations, such that it "may be required to bear responsibility for the
damage arising from [its] acts.' 46 As a general matter, modern writers do
not view the legal personality of international organizations or their sub-
jection to international law as controversial.4 1 Problems begin to emerge
when, from the general proposition that international law applies to an
international organization, one attempts to draw specific conclusions.




The ICJ was clear in its merits judgment in the Bosnian Genocide
case that a "duality of responsibility" exists, such that the responsibility
of one international actor does not in itself preclude the responsibility of
another.14 The Court was concerned principally there with the relation
144. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Law of Treaties, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/100 (1956) (prepared by G.G. Fitzmaurice), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 108, U.N. Doc. A/3159.
145. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11); see also First Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 11,
In 16-20, at 9-12. For writers on the legal personality of international organizations, see JOSE
E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 129-39 nn.63-101 (2005).
146. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of Special Rapporteur of
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 88-89 (Apr. 29). As late as
the 1980s, publicists still had expressed doubt on the point. See, e.g., Summary Records of the
Meetings of the 2024th Meeting, [1987] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 194-95, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1987; cf. ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and
Observations Received from Governments and International Organizations, 28-29, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/556 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Comments] (comment of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo); 2007 Comments, supra note 31, at 14 (comment of the European
Commission).
147. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 648-50 (7th
ed. 2003).
148. On the relation generally between attribution of conduct to an international organi-
zation and attribution of conduct to a State, see ILC, Second Report on Responsibility of
International Organizations, U 5-13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/541 (Apr. 1, 2004) (prepared by
Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter Second Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja].
149. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 1 173 (Feb. 26).
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between individuals and States, but duality, or "plurality" to use the
word in the relevant ILC articles,5 pertains to the relation between in-
ternational organizations and their constituent States as well."' As a
general matter, then, responsibility can attach to both the international
organization and its constituent States. In a given case, however, respon-
sibility does not necessarily attach to both, and how, if at all, it attaches
to the constituent States must be referred to the relevant rules of interna-
tional responsibility.
Central to the rules of international responsibility of international
organizations is the capacity of organizations to hold rights and obliga-
tions. As noted above, the international organization, as an international
legal person, holds rights and obligations, and it does so independently
of the States that constitute it. Yet the independence of the international
organization is relative; the responsibility of an international organiza-
tion, at least on some general level, is related to that of Member States.
This began to be seen early in the history of the modern development of
a law of international organizations. Liberia, for example, in the IMCO
proceedings, said that,
the legality of the conduct not only of international institutions
but also of the Members themselves in relation to the activities
of such institutions is governed as well by general rules of inter-
national constitutional law as by the express terms of the
constituent instrument of the organization.
2
The task for recent codifiers has been to develop rules that express the
relation in specific terms rather than merely acknowledge its existence.
At least two reasons of practical policy exist for imputing the con-
duct of an international organization to its Member States. First, it may
be that the organization is not subject to any process that affords an in-
jured party a chance to seek reparation. The main observation in this
connection is that the United Nations and other international organiza-
tions are not subject to proceedings in the ICJ.'53 Second, even if the
organization is subject to process, its suitors may discover that it is an
150. See Sixth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 124, draft art. 47. Accord-
ing to the Special Rapporteur, "[w]hen an international organization is responsible for an
internationally wrongful act, another entity may also be responsible for the same act." Id. 24,
at 9.
151. See id. l, draft art. 50.
152. Written Statement of the Government of Liberia, Constitution of Maritime Safety
Committee of Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. Pleadings
71 (Nov. 19, 1959).
153. James Crawford & Tom Grant, International Court of Justice, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 193, 204-06 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds.,
2007).
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empty shell. This was the problem in the Tin Council Case.154 The credi-
tors of the Sixth International Tin Council (which had collapsed during a
tin glut) were able to sue the Council in English court.'55 However, the
Council was insolvent and thus, practically judgment proof.'56 The credi-
tors sought judgment against the States which had constituted the
Council, but English courts "possess[ed] neither the evidence nor the
authority to pronounce judgment" on the Member States.5 7 This was the
functional equivalent of the corporate shield-but with no provision for
veil piercing.'58
States acting in cooperation (or collusion as the case may be) do not
always do so in the framework of an international organization. The
Administering Authority, a body created by Australia, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom for purposes of phosphate mining in Nauru, was not
an international legal person. 59 There was thus no problem in attributing
to the three States acts associated with the mining industry in Nauru
(which devastated the local environment), and the ICJ was a forum in
which proceedings could be instituted.' 6° It also may be that a "coalition
of the willing," if its actions cannot be proven to have taken place under
the mandate of an international organization, is really a consortium of its
participants, each State retaining responsibility for any breach the coali-
tion might be shown to have committed. Thus the U.K. House of Lords
in Al-Jedda said:
The UN did not dispatch the coalition forces to Iraq. The [Coali-
tion Provisional Authority] was established by the coalition
states, notably the US, not the UN. When the coalition states be-
came occupying powers in Iraq they had no UN mandate .... It
has not, to my knowledge, been suggested that the treatment of
detainees at Abu Ghraib was attributable to the UN rather than
the US. Following UNSCR 1483 in May 2003 the role of the
UN was a limited one focused on humanitarian relief and recon-
struction, a role strengthened but not fundamentally altered by
UNSCR 1511 in October 2003. By UNSCR 1511, and again by
UNSCR 1546 in June 2004, the UN gave the multinational force
express authority to take steps to promote security and stability
in Iraq, but... the Security Council was not delegating its power
154. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Int'l Tin Council, [1989] 3 All E.R. 418.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 419.
157. Id. at 482.
158. See Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30, 8, at 4; see also MALCOM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1201-04 (5th ed. 2003).
159. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 258 (June 26).
160. Id. at 258-62; see Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30, at 2-3.
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by empowering the UK to exercise its function but was authoris-
ing the UK to carry out functions it could not perform itself. At
no time did the US or the UK disclaim responsibility for the
conduct of their forces or the UN accept it. It cannot realistically
be said that US and UK forces were under the effective com-
mand and control of the UN, or that UK forces were under such
command and control when they detained the appellant. 6'
The Coalition was certainly not an international organization in its own
right; and the States comprising it, notwithstanding later Security Coun-
cil practice, were not acting under U.N. cover for purposes of
responsibility.
The modern creation of so many new international organizations-
and real organizations, not mere consortia-means, however, greater
opportunities for shielding collective action behind a separate corporate
legal personality. This presents the risk that States will resort to the or-
ganizations they constitute as a comprehensive means to avoid
responsibility for what, in truth, are their own initiatives. One source of a
solution, perhaps, is the judiciary. The ECtHR, like the House of Lords,
in certain cases has prevented States from escaping responsibility
through their membership in international organizations. For example, in
Waite & Kennedy v. Germany the ECtHR said that it would be "incom-
patible with the purpose and object of the [Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950)] ... if the Con-
tracting States were ... absolved from their responsibility under the
Convention" by their agreement to vest certain competences and accord
certain immunities to the European Space Agency. 62 The Agency can
carry out functions for which States created it, but those functions cannot
include serving as a black hole of international responsibility. (The
House of Lords in Al-Jedda referred to the relevant passage of Waite &
Kennedy).163 The ECtHR followed Waite & Kennedy with Bosphorus
Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, asserting that
"absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention respon-
sibility in the areas covered by ... a transfer [of sovereignty to an
international organization] would be incompatible with the purpose and
object of the Convention." '64 These cases are only a start and, in any
161. R (on the application of AI-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58,
$ 23-24 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see also Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30,
4, at 2.
162. Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261, 287 (1999).
163. AI-Jedda, [2007] UKHL 58, 1 37.
164. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No.
45036/98, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 44 (2005). On the Bosphorus case, see Cathryn Costello, The
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event, they arose within the European human rights framework, which,
at least one State has suggested, may limit their wider relevance to the
allocation of responsibility between Member States and international
organizations.'
Invoking obligations under the European Convention, however, is
not guaranteed to attach responsibility to the Member State. The Be-
hrami and Behrami case and the Saramati case (which the ECtHR
joined when considering admissibility) both arose out of events in Kos-
ovo-respectively, a munitions accident and an arrest and detention.
According to the Court,
the circumstances of the present cases are essentially different
from those with which the Court was concerned in the Bospho-
rus case. In its judgment in that case, the Court noted that the
impugned act (seizure of the applicant's leased aircraft) had
been carried out by the respondent State authorities, on its terri-
tory and following a decision by one of its Ministers .... The
Court did not therefore consider that any question arose as to its
competence, notably ratione personae, vis-A-vis the respondent
State despite the fact that the source of the impugned seizure
was an EC Council Regulation which, in turn, applied a UNSC
Resolution. In the present cases, the impugned acts and omis-
sions of [the Kosovo Force (KFOR)] and [the U.N. Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK)] cannot be attributed to the respondent States
and, moreover, did not take place on the territory of those States
or by virtue of a decision of their authorities. The present cases
are therefore clearly distinguishable from the Bosphorus case in
terms both of the responsibility of the respondent States under
Article 1 and of the Court's competence ratione personae.
There exists, in any event, a fundamental distinction between the
nature of the international organisation and of the international
cooperation with which the Court was there concerned and those
in the present cases. As the Court has found above, UNMIK was
a subsidiary organ of the UN created under Chapter VII and
KFOR was exercising powers lawfully delegated under Chapter
VII of the Charter by the [U.N. Security Council]. As such, their
actions were directly attributable to the UN, an organisation of
Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred
Boundaries in Europe, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 87 (2006).
165. 2005 Comments, supra note 146, at 55-59 (comments of Germany).
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universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security• 166
objective.
In short, personnel from the Member States were deployed as part of
UNMIK and KFOR, which were not State organs, but U.N. organs. The
United Nations held responsibility for the acts involved; the Member
States did not. In the Beri and Kalini6 and Bilbija cases, where the chal-
lenges concerned dismissal of government officials in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the ECtHR again attributed conduct to the United Nations,
not to the Member State.' 67 (Here, the conduct sought to be impugned was
that of the High Representative, to whom the Security Council assigns far-
reaching authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina).16 From the judicial deci-
sions at any rate, which attracted considerable criticism,' 69 it is therefore
certainly too soon to say that a body of consistent practice exists generally
favorable to attaching responsibility to the Member States.
Though the House of Lords in Al Jedda determined that the relation
of Multinational Forces in Iraq to the Security Council was not to be
equated to that of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo, the determination was
tightly bound to the operational facts of the Iraq deployment. 7 Al Jedda
in itself hardly suggests that courts will be quick in general to strip
States of the shielding that comes from attributing conduct to the organi-
zations they constitute, even as the judiciary may push back against non-
accountability in particular cases. Erika de Wet is correct to note "the
hesitance of regional and domestic courts in exercising judicial review in
instances where normative measures stemming from a powerful interna-
166. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, & Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01,
45 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE10, 151 (2007).
167. Beri6 v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 36357/04, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE6, 91
(2008); Kalini6 & Bilbija v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 45541/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008),
available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.aspitem=1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ka
linic&sessionid=26551559&skin=hudoc-en (last visited July 11, 2009).
168. S.C. Res. 1031, [ 26-27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (Dec. 15, 1995).
169. See, e.g., Thomas Giegerich, The Is and the Ought of International Constitutional-
ism: How Far Have We Come on Habermas's Road to a "Well-Considered
Constitutionalization of International Law"?, 10 GERMAN L.J. 31, 55-57 (2009); Kjetil Mu-
jezinovi6 Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The "Ultimate Authority and
Control" Test, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 509, 512-25 (2008); Aurel Sari, Jurisdiction and Interna-
tional Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 151, 158-59 (2008); Guglielmo Verdirame, Breaches of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights Resulting from the Conduct of International Organisations, 2008 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (2008); K. William Watson, Berhami v. France: Constructive
Blue Helmets Protect KFOR Nations from Accountability, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 575,
589 (2008).
170. R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58,
8-25 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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tional institution directly conflict with human rights obligations. '' 7' At
least when the Security Council adopts a mandate under Chapter VII, a
party seeking to assert responsibility against the State deploying person-
nel under the mandate may face considerable difficulty.
States, for their part, remain clear as to the separateness of State re-
sponsibility and international organization responsibility. "The overall
trend in German State practice," for example, "is to deny State responsi-
,,172
bility for the actions of international organizations. Poland suggested
that a "progressive development of international law" should elucidate
"the scope of responsibility of the Member State for acts of the organiza-
tion" and added that "the current international practice does not indicate
the existence of any rules of general (customary) international law show-
ing a clear solution of the question posed."'73 Italy refers to cases in
which the Court of Cassation "held that the organs of an international
organization ... are to be distinguished for legal purposes from the or-
gans of Member States."' 74 Denmark, Estonia, Greece, the United
Kingdom, and Portugal adopted consistent positions in submissions to
the ECtHR in the Behrami and Saramati cases.'75 Leading publicists take
a similar position. The Institut de Droit International in Article 6(a) of its
1995 resolution said, "[s]ave as [otherwise] specified.., there is no gen-
eral rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to
their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations
of an international organization of which they are members."'' 76 And the
ILC, in its commentary to draft article 29 on the Responsibility of Inter-
national Organizations says that it is "clear that ... membership does not
as such entail for member States international responsibility when the
organization commits an internationally wrongful act."'77
The insulation that the Member States enjoy against the international
organization's own wrongful acts has left it for claimants to characterize
such acts as not in truth belonging to the international organization. This
171. Erika de Wet, Holding International Institutions Accountable: The Complementary
Role of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1987, 2010
(2008).
172. 2005 Comments, supra note 146, at 65.
173. ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations
Received from Governments, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/547 (Aug. 6, 2004).
174. Id. at 13 nn.9-10.
175. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, & Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01,
45 Eur. H.R. Rep. SEl0, 97-117 (2007).
176. Institut de Droit International, The Legal Consequences for Member States of the
Non-Fulfillment by International Organizations of Their Obligations Toward Third Parties,
66-11 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 445 (1996). For a discussion of the
exceptions, including acquiescence or an abuse of rights, reliance, and agency, see SHAW,
supra note 158, at 1201-04.
177. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, at 287.
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has led to the development of a small, but apparently growing, jurispru-
dence around draft article 5 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of
International Organizations. Draft article 5 provides that "[t]he conduct
of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organiza-
tion that is placed at the disposal of another international organization
shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organiza-
tion if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct."
The House of Lords said that the requisite control for establishing the
responsibility of the international organization is quite strict. According
to the House of Lords, the relevant questions to ask when determining
whether that degree of control exists are as follows:
Were UK forces placed at the disposal of the UN? Did the UN
exercise effective control over the conduct of UK forces? ...
Did the UN have effective command and control over the con-
duct of UK forces when they detained the appellant? Were the
UK forces part of a UN peacekeeping force in Iraq?'
The ECtHR, by contrast, implied that draft article 5 is relatively lenient
in the standard it sets for determining whether the international organiza-
tion controls the organ or personnel in question. According to the
ECtHR, it is enough that the international organ "retained ultimate au-
thority and control so that operational command only was delegated.' 79
In other words, the State personnel or organs could continue to be under
the "operational control" of the State yet, for purposes of draft article 5,
the international organization would hold international responsibility for
their conduct.
Writers have criticized the "ultimate control" test as misconstruing
draft article 5.180 They would call on courts to follow the House of Lords
approach in Al-Jedda and make clear that only truly "effective control"
suffices, if a State is to avoid responsibility, and the definition of "effec-
tive control" is such as to leave very little, if any, control, operational or
otherwise, in the hands of the State. Such a judicial approach however
178. R. (on the application of AI-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58,
[22] (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
179. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, & Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01,
45 Eur. H.R. Rep. SEI0, 133 (2007).
180. E.g., Pierre Bodeau-Livinec et al., Agim Behrami & Bekir Behrami v. France; Ruz-
hdi Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 323, 328 (2008); Larsen,
supra note 169, at 514-25; Alexander Orakhelashvili, R (on the Application of AI-Jedda) (FC)
v. Secretary of State for Defence, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 342-3 (2008); Sari, supra note 169,
at 164. Cassese, by contrast, suggests that it will be difficult in practice to prove what degree
of control existed and, thus, that a test of "global control" is the most precise that courts prac-
tically can implement. Antonio CAssese, The Nicaragua and Tadi6 Tests Revisited in Light of
the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 649, 657 (2007). This implicitly
approves the European Court's approach.
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does not address the larger problem. The larger problem, it is submitted,
is that the international organization, once its responsibility is estab-
lished, largely keeps responsibility to itself. As noted, with responsibility
held by the organization, there is little prospect of a legal process vindi-
cating the rights of an injured party, for the organization avoids the
effective mechanisms of accountability that claimants might employ.
Responsibility so limited is responsibility with little or no practical con-
sequence. Yet to attack the problem by seeking to close up the
interpretation of draft article 5 is an incomplete strategy, for cases will
still exist in which "effective control" has been duly transferred from
State to organization. If only in the interest of preserving the meaning
and effectiveness of draft article 5, there must remain some situation in
which the international organization exercises effective control over the
State resources committed to its command. Thus, however much courts
may tighten the definition of draft article 5, States may craft the terms of
their relations to the international organization so as to fall within the
definition. The benefits to States of handing over "effective control" to
the organization are much too great for States in all cases to be jealous
about who commands their forces. The exchange--control given for
freedom from responsibility gained-is likely to continue, and, as the
rules of attribution now stand, in turn, to perpetuate the Behrami prob-
lem.
As a matter of general principle, it need not be that vesting responsi-
bility in the organization inevitably results in the State avoiding
responsibility. Responsibility may be held by both. The ILC acknowl-
edges this possibility in the draft articles. Draft article 50, paragraph 1
would provide as follows:
Where an international organization and one or more States or
other organizations are responsible for the same internationally
wrongful act, the responsibility of each responsible entity may
be invoked in relation to that act. However, if the responsibility
of an entity is only subsidiary, it may be invoked only to the ex-
tent that the invocation of the primary responsibility has not led
to reparation.'
It is most unlikely that the international organization will be compelled
to make reparation, so the condition (that invocation of the primary re-
sponsibility "has not led to reparation") in the typical case is most likely
181. Sixth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 125, 27, at 10; see also Sari,
supra note 169, at 159 ("The attributability of the relevant acts and omissions to the UN
merely demonstrates that the UN could in principle incur responsibility for the internationally
wrongful conduct of KFOR and UNMIK, but this [does not exclude] the possibility that the
same conduct may also be attributable to the respondent States....").
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to have been met. Though the subsidiary responsibility of the State is
established only by way of exception to a general rule, such responsibil-
ity, it is submitted, is the more promising mechanism for reaching States
for conduct that they otherwise all too easily may shield behind organ-
izational cover. The ILC, apparently in an exercise of its function of
progressive development, ' indeed attempts in this way to tackle the
problem of the international organization shielding its Member States.
The draft articles incorporate a chapter respecting "Responsibility of a
State in Connection with the Act of an International Organization."8
Draft articles 25 through 30 are as follows:
Article 25
Aid or assistance by a State in the commission of an internation-
ally wrongful act by an international organization
A State which aids or assists an international organization in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is in-
ternationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of
the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that State.
Article 26
Direction and control exercised by a State over the commission
of an internationally wrongful act by an international organiza-
tion
A State which directs and controls an international organization
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the lat-
ter is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of
the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that State.
Article 27
182. Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1(1), U.N.
Doc. (Nov. 21, 1947).
183. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, at 261-63.
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Coercion of an international organization by a State
A State which coerces an international organization to commit
an act is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) The act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally
wrongful act of that international organization;
(b) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of
the act.
Article 28
International responsibility in case of provision of competence
to an international organization
1. A State member of an international organization incurs inter-
national responsibility if it circumvents one of its
international obligations by providing the organization with
competence in relation to that obligation, and the organization
commits an act that, if committed by that State, would have
constituted a breach of that obligation.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether or not the act in question is in-
ternationally wrongful for the international organization.
Article 29
Responsibility of a State member of an international organiza-
tion for the internationally wrongful act of that organization
1. Without prejudice to draft articles 25 to 28, a State member of
an international organization is responsible for an internation-
ally wrongful act of that organization if:
(a) It has accepted responsibility for that act; or
(b) It has led the injured party to rely on its responsibility.
2. The international responsibility of a State which is entailed in
accordance with paragraph 1 is presumed to be subsidiary.
Article 30
Effect of this chapter
This chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibil-
ity, under other provisions of these draft articles, of the
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international organization which commits the act in question, or
of any other international organization.
Considering that the ILC in the drafting work on State responsibility ex-
pressly reserved the matter addressed in these draft articles, and
considering further that the practice of States and judicial and arbitral
organs in this field remains rather limited, it will not be surprising if
draft articles 25 through 30 are met with a combination of criticism (es-
pecially on the ground that practice discloses insufficient evidence to
support them)1 5 and neglect.16 Writers already have warned that imput-
ing responsibility to the constituent States might cast doubt on the
viability of the international organization as a separate legal person.' 7
The draft articles concerning attachment of responsibility to the Member
State nevertheless are of considerable interest for present purposes. Sev-
eral of them may be relevant to the responsibility of the Member States
of the United Nations in connection with decisions to admit new mem-
bers.
Draft article 29(1) would establish state responsibility in two situa-
tions: under paragraph 1(a), there would be responsibility where the
Member State accepted it; and under paragraph l(b), responsibility
would attach to the Member State for a wrongful act of the organization
where the Member State "has led the injured party to rely on its respon-
sibility." The ILC says that acceptance of responsibility for purposes of
184. Id.
185. For example, though referring to the draft articles as a whole rather than to particu-
lar provisions, Liu Zhenmin observed that "[China] wish[es] to see more references in the
commentary to the legal and factual bases of the provisions." Liu Zhenmin, supra note 50,
50. Larsen doubts that draft article 5 finds sufficient support in existing customary interna-
tional law to merit its inclusion in the draft articles. See Larsen, supra note 169, at 518. Noting
the "relative lack of practice and jurisprudence concerning international organizations,"
Matheson suggests "[c]aution... particularly in adopting innovative formulations." Michael J.
Matheson, Current Developments: The Fifty-Eighth Session of the International Law Commis-
sion, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 407,438 (2007).
186. Bodeau-Livinec et al., supra note 180, at 330 (noting that the ECtHR, for example,
had nothing to say about draft articles 25 through 30).
187. For a summary of the commentary on this point, see Andrew Stumer, Liability of
Members States for Acts of International Organizations: Reconsidering the Policy Objections,
48 HARv. INT'L L.J. 553, 564-69 (2007). See also Jos6 Alvarez's comment:
But a more fundamental problem with the ILC's proposal is that I am not sure that
the principals here, namely the states, ever intended to make their organizations li-
able. It is certainly tenable that most [international organizations] were created in
part to avoid legal liability or at least to create entities capable of doing some things
that are denied to any one state ....
Josd E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers, 31 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 591, 613 (2008). Stumer, however, concludes that "concern for the
personality or independence of international organizations is not a sound reason" for denying
secondary responsibility. Stumer, supra note 187, at 580.
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paragraph 1(a) of draft article 29 is the "least controversial case.' 88 The
absence of any qualification to the expression "has accepted responsibil-
ity for that act" means that acceptance for purposes of draft article
29(1)(a) may be "expressly stated or implied and may occur either be-
fore or after the time when responsibility arises for the organization.',
8 9
Relating this to the question of responsibility for admission of an
applicant to membership, one may ask whether the conduct of States in
the General Assembly, such as their various statements welcoming new
Members,' 90 could have the effect of acceptance in the intended sense.
The openness of the temporal limits-"may occur either before or af-
ter"-suggests that the law prescribes no precise relation between
acceptance and the critical date-i.e., the date at which the organization
has committed a wrongful act. This perhaps would make it easier to es-
tablish the subsidiary responsibility that draft article 29 contemplates,
but the prior problem remains of identifying the State conduct amount-
ing to acceptance. As will be considered shortly, the conduct of States
pursuant to the decision-making procedures of the organs of an interna-
tional institution generally does not give rise to responsibility. The Tin
Council case, the example to which ILC Comment (7) refers, suggests
that the main case is that in which the constituent instrument or other
rules of the organization convey acceptance of responsibility.'9'
Paragraph l(b) of draft article 29 sets out a second basis for respon-
sibility of the Member State: a third party has relied on the Member
State's conduct as establishing its responsibility. Giving a financial guar-
antee in the event of the organization's insolvency (the example given in
Comment (8)'92) seems to be a mode of accepting responsibility, albeit
prior to a contingent event. The relevant cases, including the Westland
Helicopters dispute,'93 have involved expressions of "constant support" to
the organization from the Member States, such that third parties would
assume that the organization ultimately is backed up by its constitu-
ents. 4 The analogy, if any, to admission to the United Nations is the
188. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, at 289.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 97 n.8 (1983).
191. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, at 289.
192. Id.
193. Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Org. for Industrialization, 80 I.L.R. 595, 613-14
(ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. 1982).
194. Commenting on this provision, the ILC accepted that the preexisting guarantee may
invite responsibility but sought to clarify that this would also be the limit of responsibility-
i.e., States guaranteeing the finances of the organization would not hold any responsibility in
excess of the guarantee:
It may be that the international law of States' [sic] responsibility should explicitly
provide that individuals or States would have recourse... against member States of
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situation in which a Member State promises material and political assis-
tance to a newly admitted State. Such has sometimes been the practice
where the newly admitted State is a territory for which the Member State
had been responsible as administering power. The undertaking to assist
the new Member State in many instances, however, is given after admis-
sion and thus could not have been an inducement to seek admission.
Moreover, it would be hard to see how voluntary provision of aid is to be
equated to "constant support," all the more so as "constant support" in
the intended sense is support promised to the organization, not aid di-
rected to the third party.
Draft article 30 makes clear that, whether or not in a given circum-
stance State responsibility has arisen, the general system of
responsibility of international organizations remains in effect.' 95
The other three draft articles in the chapter on "Responsibility of a
State in Connection with the Act of an International Organization" relate
to the influence that a State might exercise, lawfully or otherwise, on the
conduct of an international organization.9 6 Draft article 25 deals with a
State which "aids or assists" an international organization; draft article
26, with a State which "directs and controls" an international organiza-
tion; and draft article 27, with a State which "coerces" an international
organization.197 Aiding or assisting, directing and controlling, and coerc-
ing are three distinct actions. Their connection is that they involve the
State in one way or another influencing the organization. In certain cir-
cumstances (which each draft article sets out), such action may entail the
responsibility of the State.
Excluded however from the circumstances that may give rise to re-
sponsibility is the conduct of the State carried out as part of the State's
an international organization for actions that were taken by an international organi-
zation .... However, such legal doctrine should also clearly recognize that in the
case of an international financial institution created to achieve legitimate collective
goals, and not created as a means of shielding member States from responsibility in
the discharge of pre-existing obligations, the exposure to liability of a member State
(whose relationship to the organization is comparable to a shareholder in a corpora-
tion) for the acts or omissions of the organization should be limited to the amount
of the financial contributions or guarantees of that member.
2004 Comments, supra note 31, at 10. Germany in its comments stated that the "charters of
the international banks of which Germany is a member commonly limit the liability of the
member States and shareholders to the value of their paid-in and payable shares:' 2005 Com-
ments, supra note 146, at 48. Examples cited are the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank,
Bank for International Settlements, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Id.





participation in the procedures and processes of the organization. Com-
ment (2) to draft article 25 says as follows:
Should the State be a member, the influence that may amount to
aid or assistance could not simply consist in participation in the
decision-making process of the organization according to the
pertinent rules of the organization. However, it cannot be totally
ruled out that aid or assistance could result from conduct taken
by the State within the framework of the organization. This
could entail some difficulties in ascertaining whether aid or as-
sistance has taken place in borderline cases. The factual context
such as the size of membership and the nature of the involve-
ment will probably be decisive.
1 98
According to Comment (2) to draft article 26,
[a]s in the case of aid or assistance [under draft article 25], a dis-
tinction has to be made between participation by a Member State
in the decision-making process of the organization according to
its pertinent rules, and direction and control which would trigger
the application of the present draft article.' 99
The same distinction is set out mutatis mutandis in the commentary
to draft article 27 (coercion).2 "° This is to say that, for purposes of draft
articles 25 through 27, a State does not aid or assist, direct or control,
nor coerce, when it participates "in the decision-making process of the
organization according to" its "pertinent rules. '20 ' The IMF, in comments
to draft articles 25 and 26, concurred.
As noted in Comment (2) to draft article 25, borderline cases may
arise where it is unclear whether a State's conduct in the organization be-
longs to the exception and thus cannot be a basis for attribution. This
supposes certain core cases where there would be little doubt. An organi-
zation has rules under which its Member States control its conduct. These
in particular include the rules whereby an assembly, council, or other body
comprised of some or all Member States reaches corporate decisions as to
the disposition of the organization as a whole. In many organizations, the
main membership bodies operate under a more or less developed parlia-
mentary system. In the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, the
198. Id. at 279.
199. Id. at 281.
200. Id. at 282.
201. Id. at 279, 281, 282.
202. 2007 Comments, supra note 31, at 19.
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parliamentary system is highly developed. 03 Voting under the procedures
of the principal U.N. organs is clearly a core case. Accepting that it is,
the draft articles would exclude a State's voting behavior within the
United Nations as a basis for attribution to the State.
This situation seems broadly consistent with rules of parliamentary
immunity found in national legal systems. The members of parliament
are not individually responsible (under law) for the decisions taken by
the legislatures in which they exercise a vote. Nor are their votes gener-
ally a basis for criminal or civil liability. Article I, section 6, clause I of
the Constitution of the United States addresses, inter alia, the immunity
of members of the House or Senate. According to the Speech or Debate
Clause therein, "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not
be questioned in any other Place." This rather general constitutional pro-
vision equates to a wide immunity protecting acts done pursuant to
parliamentary proceedings. The United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Brewster for example said, "the Speech or Debate Clause pro-
hibits inquiry ... into those things generally said or done in the House or
Senate in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for
those acts.'2 3° The refusal of the Supreme Court to look into "the motiva-
tion for legislative acts" recalls the refusal of the ICJ to look into "the
reasons which, in the mind of a Member, may prompt its vote."2 5 The
ECtHR also has considered that immunity is conferred "on members of




The analogy to States in international organizations is not however
exact. Certain principles underlie the immunity of national parliamen-
tarians. With respect to a number of these, relations are difficult to find
to the circumstances of an inter-governmental assembly. For example,
representatives in national parliaments represent "the people"; citizens
under one legal system clothe certain of their fellow citizens with author-
ity to reach collective decisions on their behalf.2 0 7 States in the United
Nations by contrast are the main constituents of the relevant legal sys-
tem, not representatives of others; the development of democratic
203. See, e.g., SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL (3d ed. 1998) (providing extensive treatment of the parliamentary system and proce-
dure of the U.N. Security Council).
204. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
205. Conditions of Admission of State for Membership in United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 60 (May 28).
206. Cordova v. Italy (No. 1), 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 243 (noting, without rejecting,
the statement of the Government of Italy regarding immunity for votes).
207. See, e.g., id. ("The Government [of Italy] noted that... immunity [serves] to ensure
that the representatives of the people enjoyed the greatest possible freedom of expression in
the exercise of their functions... ). See also the Government's observations in Lingens v.
Austria, App. No. 8803/79, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 381 (1981).
1148 [Vol. 30:1095
Responsibility and Admission
principles in international organizations has not advanced to the point
that Qt .t.... 1ntr . ri.ihln,, tribunes, their inhabitants like world citi-
zens. The common law origin of parliamentary immunity in national
systems0 8 is also a feature distinguishing it from the international situa-
tion. It well may be that "[t]he immunities of the Speech or Debate
Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or
private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of
the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legis-
lators.,,209 The international legal system, including international
organizations, is much harder to separate from the interests of States.
The purpose of the modern human rights project well may be to achieve
such a separation. It, too, has some distance to progress before being
complete. As for the concern over independence and separation of pow-
ers ("free[dom] from the cognizance or coercion of the coordinate
branches"), these similarly are difficult to transpose directly to the inter-
national setting.
Whatever the origins in legal principle behind the rules of immunity
and attribution, it is fairly clear that responsibility will not attach to
Member States for votes they cast on applications for admission to
membership. Owing to their character as participants in the constitu-
tional system of the Organization, the Member States will not be
responsible even if their votes are in breach of Article 4 or other relevant
provisions of the Charter.
The same is not the case with respect to decisions reached by organs
of the organization. Decisions of the Security Council or General Assem-
bly clearly may engage the responsibility of the United Nations. Draft
article 4, paragraph 1 on Responsibility of International Organizations
states that "[tihe conduct of an organ or agent of an international organiza-
tion in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be
considered as an act of that organization under international law whatever
position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization."20 Com-
ment (3) to draft article 4 sees the Cumaraswamy Advisory Opinion 2 " as
encompassing within conduct of the United Nations conduct of its princi-
pal and subsidiary organs as well as conduct of its agents.22 Comment (5)
208. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
209. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507.
210. 2004 ILC Report, supra note 54, at 103.
211. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of Special Rapporteur of
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 88 (Apr. 29).
212. 2004 ILC Report, supra note 54, at 105-06. With respect to agents, there often will
be questions of immunity. Id. ("[T]he question of immunity from legal process is distinct from
the issue of compensation for any damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the
United Nations or by its agents in their official capacity."); see also 2004 Comments, supra
note 31, at 26-27 (comment of the IMF).
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says, "[w]hen persons or entities are characterized as organs by the rules
of the organization, there is no doubt that the conduct of those persons or
entities has to be attributed, in principle, to the organization."23 The
Swiss Federal Council says, "[a]s a rule, one may attribute to an interna-
tional organization acts and omissions of its organs of all rank and nature
and of its agents in the exercise of their competences. 24 The U.N. Char-
ter Article 7 identifies the Security Council and General Assembly as
two of the six "principal organs of the United Nations." The ICJ was
clear that controlling admission to membership is one of the functions of
those organs.25" Even where the organ or agent of an international organi-
zation exceeds its competence, the presumption is in favor of
responsibility.
216
If casting a vote that results in a particular decision by the central or-
gans of the organization is not a basis for attribution, then the Member
State will not be held responsible for a decision by the principal organs
to admit an applicant. Therefore, the responsibility of the organization,
not of its Member States, is the relevant consideration. The ILC appar-
ently proposed draft article 30 as a saving clause to make clear that the
lack of a basis for attribution to the Member States does not equate to
immunity for the organization as a whole.2 17 Assuming that the organiza-
tion indeed is the only possible holder of responsibility for decisions to
admit a State to membership, the question then arises how the organiza-
tion might be held accountable. This question presents distinct and
significant problems.
B. Mechanisms of Accountability: A Continuing Search
The second problem that responsibility of an international organiza-
tion entails is the underdevelopment of a system in international law to
render international organizations accountable. This is not an obstacle to
attribution: conduct may be attributed to an actor without regard to
mechanisms of accountability. The problem instead is one of implement-
ing practical responses-that is, of finding mechanisms of
accountability--once attribution is established. A situation may arise in
which the responsibility of the international organization is clear and, as
213. 2004 ILC Report, supra note 54, at 106; see also Second Report of Special Rappor-
teur Gaja, supra note 148, $ 14-19, at 8-10. The main question in practice often will be to
prove the functional link between the agent or organ and the organization necessary to estab-
lish attribution.
214. Decision du Conseil Federal, Doc. VPB 61.75 (Oct. 30, 1996) (Switz.) cited in
2004 ILC Report, supra note 54, at 106.
215. Competence of General Assembly for Admission of State to United Nations, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3).
216. See 2004 1LC Report, supra note 54, S 9, at 107; id. 11, 2, at 115-16.
217. 2006 ILC Report, supra note 46, 2, at 291-92.
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is usually the case, the Member States remain insulated against respon-
c;hlitr (P n ae it xwzs their voting di-rirnn- in the orgns of the
organization that led to the act or omission giving rise to responsibility).
With responsibility well established, it still may be that no mechanism of
accountability exists to provide a remedy.
Member States of the United Nations by virtue of Article 93 of the
Charter are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ and, as such, they
potentially have standing to institute proceedings before the Court. Arti-
cle 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ stipulates that "[o]nly States may be
parties in cases before the Court." International organizations are not
parties to the Statute and cannot be parties in contentious proceedings.
That is to say, an international organization cannot institute contentious
proceedings in the Court; nor can a State or other party institute conten-
tious proceedings against an international organization."' This begins to
indicate the problem of accountability with respect to the responsibility
of international organizations.
James Crawford, in the Fifth Steinkraus-Cohen International Law
Lecture (2007),2'9 described five mechanisms that may ameliorate the
accountability deficit: (i) international organizations may adopt moral
criticisms of their own conduct, as the United Nations did in connec-
tion with Rwanda and Srebenica;2 ' (ii) internal auditing mechanisms
may examine the projects of an organization (the World Bank Inspec-
tion Panel is the main example); 2 2 (iii) absent relationships in which
the international organization itself has full operational command of
forces (tantamount to secondment), Member States may be responsible
for acts they perform under the organization's mandate; 223 (iv) where
218. For an overview of jurisdiction and standing in contentious cases, see Crawford &
Grant, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS supra note 153, 193, 195-96, 198.
219. Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30.
220. Id. 15-26.
221. Id. 1 6-17 (citing The Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Inquiry into
the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257/Annex, (Dec. 16, 1999); The Secretary-General, Report of Secretary-General
Pursuant to Resolution 53/35 of the General Assembly on the Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc.
A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999)).
222. Id. [ 19.
223. Id. 20 (referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations
against Serbia); see also Second Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 148, 33-
48, at 16-23 (addressing at length the matter of attribution in connection with peacekeeping
operations). The U.N. Secretariat commented:
As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping force is, in
principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an inter-
national obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and
its liability in compensation. The fact that any such act may have been performed
by members of a national military contingent forming part of the peacekeeping op-
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international action is carried out on behalf of a State, the State itself
may assume responsibility for the consequences of the action (this
seems to have been the result reached by the Constitutional Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the appeal of Bilbija and Kalini);22 4 and (v)
secondary or subsidiary responsibility may be attached to States for the
conduct of international organizations, as proposed in the Draft Arti-
cles on Responsibility of International Organizations. The third,
fourth, and fifth mechanisms avoid the problem of the lack of account-
ability of international organizations by bringing the matter back to the
Member States, namely, by revising the rules of attribution-shifting
eration does not affect the international responsibility of the United Nations vis-a-
vis third States or individuals.
The principle of attribution of the conduct of a peacekeeping force to the United
Nations is premised on the assumption that the operation in question is conducted
under United Nations command and control, and thus has the legal status of a
United Nations subsidiary organ. In authorized Chapter VII operations conducted
under national command and control, the conduct of the operation is imputable to
the State or States conducting the operation. In joint operations, namely, those con-
ducted by a United Nations peacekeeping operation and an operation conducted
under national or regional command and control, international responsibility lies
where effective command and control is vested and practically exercised.
Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted); see also 2005 Comments, supra note 146, at 28-29 (comment
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on "[a]ttribution of the conduct of a peacekeeping
force to the United Nations or to contributing States"); id. at 63 (comment of Germany on
"[r]esponsibility of troop-contributing nations in United Nations operations").
224. Milodrad Bilbija & Dragan Kalini6, Case No. AP-953/05, Judgment of 8 July 2006,
9, 12; Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30, 21-25 (citing Appeal of Milorad Bilbija
and Dragan Kalini6, Case AP-953/05 (Jul. 8, 2006) (Bosn. & Herz.)). Note however that the
High Representative (the international organ acting in Bosnia) had a sharp response to the
Constitutional Court, even though the latter had gone to lengths to emphasize the continued
effectiveness and binding character of decisions of the former:
Any step taken by any institution or authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to
establish any domestic mechanism to review the Decisions of the High Representa-
tive issued pursuant to his international mandate shall be considered by the High
Representative as an attempt to undermine the implementation of the civilian as-
pects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and shall be treated in itself as conduct undermining such implementation.
Office of the High Representative, Order on the Implementation of the Decision of the Consti-
tutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Appeal of Milorad Bilbija, art. 2, AP-953/05
(Mar. 23, 2007). International organs evidently do not take kindly to attempts to curtail their
freedom from accountability. For comment on the Order of March 23, 2007, see Thomas D.
Grant, Cyprus Policy Center Conference on the Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead: The Dayton
Settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Post-Conflict Model: Lessons for Cyprus, 8-10
(May 7, 2007), available at http://cpc.emu.edu.trlhaber-oku.asp?haber=-57 (last visited July 7,
2009).
225. Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30, 26.
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attribution of the wrongful act from the less accountable organization, to
the more accountable Member State.
In addition to the five mechanisms described, there is the internal
system of dispute settlement within the United Nations under Article
VIII of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations.226 The system is limited however to contractual and em-
ployment disputes that, it has been said, fall under a "lex specialis as
between the organization and its members and agents and among its
members. 227 The system does not as such "provide any avenue for re-
dress as to the public activities of the Organization. 228 Claims practice
for violations of international law by an international organization, un-
surprisingly, is sparse.2 29 A further way to increase accountability for
public activities would be to establish contentious jurisdiction before the
ICJ over international organizations (including the United Nations and
its specialized agencies). This would have the virtue of directness, but is
probably unattainable given the political hurdles to Charter amend-
ment. 3 °
V. CONSEQUENCES OF ADMISSION AND
THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION
Assuming that a party against which a breach has occurred can be
identified, and a party exists to which the wrongful act attaches, it then is
necessary, if reparation is due for the breach, to specify injuries that the
breach has caused. Injuries are a subset of the total consequences of the
wrongful act, but, crucially, they are not a necessary subset: a wrongful
act does not in every instance entail compensable injuries to the party
wronged. The award in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic
of Tanzania illustrates how, for example, a State can breach a bilateral
investment treaty without having "caused" an injury in the relevant
226. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. VIII,
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 US.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
227. 2005 Comments, supra note 146, at 38 (comment of the IMF). WIPO, however,
took the position that "established or generally accepted principles of international law" also
should be applied in the relations between an organization and its Member States and its
agents. Id. at 39.
228. Steinkraus-Cohen Lecture, supra note 30, 1 13.
229. See 2004 Comments, supra note 31, at 28-33 (comments of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IMF, Multinational Force and Observers, Organization of
American States, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, United Nations De-
velopment Programme, WHO, and World Trade Organization that no claims had been made
against their respective agencies alleging violations of international law).
230. On the (limited if "inevitable") role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), see
KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 224-61 (2002).
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sense " ' A general question therefore first should be asked: what are the
consequences of admission of a State to membership in the United Na-
tions? This avoids a question-begging formulation that would assume the
consequences to be injurious. In many cases, it is nearly impossible to
see how they could be. After all, admission of Switzerland has not
caused identifiable injury to any party! It was suggested at the beginning
of this Article that the consequences of admission of a State to member-
ship in the United Nations are clear enough, with respect to the internal
operations of the United Nations and to the State's obligations as a
member. The question presented, then, is what wider effects admission
may have, and how, if at all, any of them, at least in particular circum-
stances, might constitute an injury upon which a party could claim
reparation. 32
It is therefore important to bear in mind, then, that the word "ef-
fects," as used in the ILC's work on responsibility, has a broad meaning.
It includes both lawful effects and unlawful effects; and it includes both
effects that may be traced back to a prior act for purposes of reparation
and those that are logically too far separated from the prior act to give
rise to a new legal situation for the actor. This second distinction brings
theories of causation into play. There are effects in a general logical
sense (act X is a necessary predicate to effect Y-but for X there could
have been no Y); and there are effects in the sense that a given act has a
legal connection to its result. The legal connection that concerns us here
is that giving rise to responsibility on the part of the party having per-
formed the act, such that the party has a new obligation-namely, the
obligation to make reparation. Some theories of causation may require a
fairly close link between the act and its effects, if for purposes of respon-
sibility the effects are to be attached to the party having authored the
act.233 Or, perhaps, the legal connection may exist where the link between
act and effect is not so close. Proximity may be measured in time, physi-
cal space, or other relationships. Even under a theory requiring less
proximity, "the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond
a certain point.' '23 To fix responsibility on some party for an act is to
231. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 461-67 (2007).
232. When the IAEA examined its international responsibility in relation to activities
under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements adopted after the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it implied that a necessary step to defining its responsibility
is to identify which activities under the Agreements might give rise to damage. 2004 Com-
ments, supra note 31, at 25-26. This in turn implied that certain other activities cannot give
rise to damage. A better approach is to consider first the consequences of a given activity and
then to consider whether any of those consequences are injurious, rather than to exclude a
priori that given activities may be injurious.
233. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
234. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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identify an act having consequences traceable to the party for legal pur-
poses. The relevance of legal theories of causation arises in this
connection.
The admission of a State to membership in the United Nations has a
number of consequences, each of which will be noted below in turn. It
then will be considered whether a given consequence is sufficiently
proximate to the act of admitting the State that it might have a legal con-
nection to the party that reached the decision to perform the act. Finally,
if a given consequence is injurious, it will be asked whether one may
speak of an obligation to make reparation.
A. Consequences of admission
1. Consequences Relative to Statehood
The admission of a State to the United Nations does not create the
State. This point has been made elsewhere. For example, the ICJ could
say that "[t]here is no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro is a State for the
purposes of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute"-before it said
whether that State was a member of the United Nations and thus a Party
to the Statute by virtue of Article 35(1).231 It follows from earlier practice
as well: States existed before there was a United Nations. It follows even
more closely from the logic of the Charter: to be admitted, the applicant
must already be a State.
Moreover, the rights and obligations of a State under general interna-
tional law clearly do not begin with admission. It is central to an
understanding of international law as guarantor of basic public order that
any particular formal status-such as membership in an international
organization-cannot be the prerequisite to protection from the use or
threat of force: a State does not acquire license to use force at the inter-
national level simply by denying the status of the target of its
contemplated aggression. 36 Admission of a State as a member of the
United Nations is therefore clearly not the act creating the obligation to
refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of the
State. Nor is continued membership a requirement for continued state-
hood. Sean Murphy notes that suspension from an organization-from
235. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 279, 298-99 (Dec.
15).
236. Consider the highly concerning remarks by Russian officials about Georgia. Vitaly
Churkin, Russian Permanent Representative, Statement at U.N. Security Council Debate
(Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/d/l12799.html (last
visited June 13, 2009) (saying that Georgia's conduct "calls into question the viability of
Georgia as a state"). The unspoken position is that lack of "viability" strips Georgia of the
normal international law protections. This is clearly an unfounded position and if accepted
would be inimical to public order.
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the Organization of American States (OAS) for example-by no means
calls into question the existence of the State suspended.237
Yet the relation between statehood and membership in the United
Nations is significant. The requirement under Charter Article 4(1) that,
to be admitted, the applicant be a State forges a link between the United
Nations and statehood. It means that admission, at the very least, is a
certification by the Organization as to the status of the entity as a State.238
Given its role as the chief organized expression of international society
and the (continued) position of States as the main components of that
society, the United Nations is more than a passive observer of such mat-
ters. The move toward universal membership in the United Nations tends
to increase the significance of the relation between membership and
statehood. If the States of the world and the United Nations were to form
an identity, then that in itself would be significant.
The link between the United Nations and statehood is reflected in in-
ternational instruments as well. Under Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia, three categories of entities are States for purposes of the Rules.
The first category is "a State Member or non-Member of the United Na-
tions.' 39 Again, although it is clear that membership in the United
Nations is not a prerequisite to statehood, nor does admission constitute
the State, there exists a natural relation between statehood and U.N.
membership. Why else define the category "State" by reference to mem-
bership at all? That a drafter would have thought it necessary to clarify
that the category is not limited to U.N. membership reflects the tendency
to think of U.N. membership and statehood as coterminous.
The relation between statehood and U.N. membership is not contro-
versial, at least at some level of generality. After all, the Organization is
open to "all other peace-loving states." Writers have observed the con-
nection between U.N. membership and statehood. 240 According to Martin
Dixon, U.N. membership "will now entail a presumption of statehood
which it would be very difficult to dislodge., 24' Rosenne says admission
237. Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Gov-
ernments, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 123, 129 (Gregory H. Fox
& Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
238. Compare MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (Blackstone 3d
ed. 1996), with MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 5th
ed. 2005) [hereinafter DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)].
239. Int'l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
at 2, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.40 (June 12, 2007).
240. E.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 230-31 (2004); SHAW, supra note 158, at 180-81; BURNS H. WESTON ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 364 (3d ed.
1997).
241. DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005), supra note 238, at 105.
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has a confirmatory effect as to the statehood of the admitted applicant.242
Admission confirms that the statehood of the admitted entity is oppos-
able against all other members. This is not to say that U.N. admission is
the only mechanism that can establish such opposability. A State is a
State for reasons other than its admission to the United Nations and,
even as they have no duty formally to recognize it as such, other States• 23
are not free to act as if a given State does not exist. 4 U.N. admission,
entailing the participation of all members in a multilateral treaty, may be
described as putting a formal frame around the opposability of statehood
toward all other U.N. members.
It would serve no purpose to revisit the extensive literature devoted
244to the question of the legal consequences of the recognition of States.
As for the relation between recognition and admission to the United Na-
tions, John Dugard addressed the matter in Recognition and the United
Nations. Some writers rejected the proposition that the United Nations
might serve as a collective mechanism for recognition on grounds that
the General Assembly was not equipped to serve that function. 4 ' Dugard
then set out the main strands of thought on the matter:
Many writers, who favour collective recognition, acknowledge
that admission to the United Nations has had a major impact on
the law of recognition, but stop short of accepting it as an act of
recognition in itself. Thus we find admission to the United Na-
tions described as "a kind of collective recognition," "a step
forward towards the principle of collective recognition," the
"nearest analogue" to collective recognition, "a system of certi-
fication which has in substance fulfilled the function of
collective recognition," "prima facie evidence of statehood,"
"tantamount to recognition of the member admitted as a State,"
and as a substitute, "to a large extent, but not for all aspects," of
traditional recognition. In more futuristic vein, Chen declares
that "[w]hen the United Nations shall have attained complete
universality, the notion of 'recognition' will wither away, and
242. SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATISES 1945-1946, at 215
(1989).
243. Cf Hans Blix, Contemporary Aspects of Recognition, 130 RECUEIL DES COURs 589,
693 (1970) ("[1B]y accepting treaties constituting international organizations, [the Member
States] must be deemed to have obliged themselves to accept the measure of relations which is
necessary under these constitutions-but not more-with authorities which fulfill the interna-
tional law criteria of governments of States members, although, in pursuit of a policy of non-
recognition, they may refuse relations outside the framework of such organizations.").
244. The legal "nature" of recognition is considered in extenso in THOMAS D. GRANT,
THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 1-82 (1999).
245. DUGARD, supra note 80, at 43-44.
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membership of the United Nations will be the sole standard of
relations between States."2 '6
That recognition indeed appears to have lessened in importance as part
of international practice over roughly the same period that the United
Nations has so nearly approximated universality tends to support Chen's
declaration. Yet States still include recognition in their repertoire of prac-
tice, and admission to the United Nations remains at most a "near
analogue" to collective recognition. That recognition both is an act left
largely to the discretion of individual States-notwithstanding occa-
sional indications to the contrary 47-and that its political character
remains pronounced further suggest the qualified role of the United Na-
tions in this connection.
As Brownlie says,
[r]ecognition, as a public act of state, is an optional and political
act and there is no legal duty in this regard. However, in a deeper
sense, if an entity bears the marks of statehood, other states put
themselves at risk legally if they ignore the basic obligations of
state relations.2 8
The principle runs the other way as well, it being doubtful whether rec-
ognition of an unlawful situation, especially where the rule breached is
jus cogens, will "offset the original illegality., 249 The question well may
be put, as it was under the Stimson Doctrine, whether recognition of an
unlawful situation itself is an unlawful act.25° It certainly may be an un-
friendly act, as against the party that the underlying unlawfulness has
injured. 5 Insofar as one may draw an analogy between admission to the
United Nations and recognition, the same considerations as apply to
"traditional" recognition would apply mutatis mutandis.
252
246. Id. at 44-45 (citing TI-CHIANG CHEN, TIHE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION
222 (1951)).
247. GRANT, supra note 244, at 149-211 (examining the case of Yugoslavia).
248. BROWNLIE, supra note 147, at 89-90 (emphasis in original).
249. Id. at 78.
250. See Thomas D. Grant, Doctrines (Monroe, Hallstein, Brezhnev, Stimson), in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1$ 8-15,40 (3d ed. 2009).
251. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 5(3), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) ("No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful."). A similar statement is included under
the first principle of the Friendly Relations Declaration. International Development Strategy
for the Second United Nations Development Decade, G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8124 (Oct. 24, 1970).
252. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, 344, at 218 (draft article 45(2), providing that
"[nlo State or international organization shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a
serious breach [by an international organization of an obligation arising under a peremptory




Difficulties arise when a State acts under cover of an international
organization. Namely, conduct authored by the State may be imputed to
the organization and responsibility thus shifted away from the one entity
subject to developed mechanisms of accountability. This problem, which
is the problem of attribution discussed above,253 is connected with admis-
sion, for it potentially arises whenever a State participates as a member
of an organization. One consequence of admission, then, is the potential
shielding of the Member State from responsibility for acts which the law
otherwise might impute to it.
The situation may differ between admission to the United Nations
and admission to considerably smaller organizations. An international
organization with only a handful of members may be open to greater
scrutiny, if membership in the organization (or its very creation) provides
legal cover to its members for acts for which they otherwise would have
to answer directly. However, scrutiny does not necessarily result in re-
moval of the legal cover. The House of Lords took a hard look at the
Sixth Tin Council, and the Member States remained insulated from re-
sponsibility.
It may not always be that way. In the NATO cases, for example, the
lack of jurisdiction meant that the ICJ did not need to reach the question
of attribution. Germany, among other States, said that responsibility does
not arise "by reason of membership for measures taken by... [the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)]."25' Yet there were indications,
albeit rather faint, that NATO membership might not have been a de-
fense against responsibility. Yugoslavia, unsurprisingly, assumed that the
Member States were responsible.255 Such a position taken by one State
engaged in proceedings is not necessarily persuasive on its own as evi-
dence of a general position. The Court however admonished the Parties
that a failure of jurisdiction does not absolve States of their obligation to
abide by international law, including the rule that disputes are to be
For references to the requirement of non-recognition of the unlawful annexation of Kuwait by
Iraq in S.C. Res. 664, [ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0664 (Aug. 9, 1990), see Fifth Report of Special
Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 108, [ 64, at 19; 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, 344, at 220
(comment (7) to draft article 45); see also Declaration by the European Community on Yugo-
slavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M.
1485, 1487 (stating that "[t]he [European] Community and its member States will not recog-
nize entities which are the result of aggression"). Admission of an entity to membership,
where States and international organizations are under an obligation to refrain from acts tend-
ing to confirm or consolidate the status of the entity, is a breach of the obligation. This is the
clear case of admission as wrongful act.
253. See supra Part V.
254. 2005 Comments, supra note 146, at 65.
255. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. 259, 268 (June 2).
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resolved by peaceful means. The Court admonished the respondents in
terms which avoided saying whether acts done in the framework of
NATO could be attributed to them: "[W]hether or not States accept the
jurisdiction of the Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts
attributable to them that violate international law, including humanitarian
law."256 If it were prima facie the case however that acts done in the
framework of NATO cannot be attributed to the Member States of that
organization, then it would be hard to justify even the Court's passing
reference to continued responsibility. The Court, while unable to dispose
of the matter, did not remain silent about it.
257
The discussion here of specialized organizations is not to say that
they are the only types of organizations that Member States might use to
shield themselves from international responsibility. On the contrary,
Member States might use a universal organization for legal cover as
well. The possibility exists that mandates of the Security Council will
shield States from attribution. Hypothetically, a State might seek admis-
sion to the United Nations for purposes of obtaining cover for unlawful
acts. This, perhaps, would be a case of admission as a wrongful act.
258
3. Legal Exposure
As membership in the United Nations may give a State cover from
wrongful acts that otherwise could be attributed to it, so conversely may
accession to independence-the predicate to admission-expose the
State to legal and other risks that the dependent territory did not face.
Communities aggregate into States for various reasons. One reason is to
limit the exposure of each community to risk. By existing under a single
State-which also is to say existing under a single legal system-
256. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.) 1999 I.C.J. at 916, 925 (June 2); Legality
of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 761,773 (June 2).
257. For works addressing the relation between the Member States and NATO in con-
nection with the Kosovo operations, see citations in Second Report of Special Rapporteur
Gaja, supra note 148, 7, at 4 n.9.
258. This recalls but is distinct from the situation in which admission must be declined
for the reason that it would tend to confirm an unlawful situation. The South African Home-
lands were not admitted as Member States of the United Nations, on grounds inter alia that
admission would have tended to confirm the policy of Apartheid of which they were an in-
strument. The hypothetical situation is one in which a State seeks membership, with a view to
carrying out unlawful acts under the auspices of the organization. Perhaps, for example, a
State seeks theaters in which its armed forces operate under minimal supervision, the State
having no regard to the lawfulness of the conduct of those forces. (Political theorists have said
that States sometimes use foreign military adventure as an outlet for domestic crisis. The locus
classicus is JOHN A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY 384 (1902)). The peacekeeping opera-
tions of the United Nations could be a channel to such theaters, a possibility suggested by the
misconduct of national contingents in some operations. To date, the problem has not arisen in
connection with admission to membership; in practice it would be hard to say in advance of
admission that an applicant was seeking to use membership as a shield for unlawful activity.
1160 [Vol. 30:1095
Summer 2009] Responsibility and Admission 1161
multiple communities can share risks and, in the event a particular risk
materializes, they can draw on one another's resources to aid in recovery
from harm. The smaller the State in terms of material resources, the
more concentrated the risk; and the more difficult the recovery.
International law contains little if any obligation to render material
assistance to other States. The duty to make reparation comes into exis-
tence where responsibility is established. Responsibility is established in
certain, but not all, situations where a State has suffered harm. Natural
disasters, for example, are not treated as any State's fault and thus are
not cognized in the law of responsibility.5 9 As such, the international
legal system does not include a mandatory system of cost-spreading
when such events cause injury to or within a State. Accession to inde-
pendence brings certain benefits associated with international legal
personality; once independent, the community, as a State, has access to
international processes that it did not when it existed as part of another
State. However, rendering assistance to mitigate injuries such as those
resulting from hurricanes, earthquakes, crop failures, and the like, is not
an obligation in international law and receiving such assistance thus is
not a right associated with international legal personality. If what is
sought is mandatory cost-spreading, the independent State is restricted to
adopting its own measures, under its own laws, which by definition ap-
ply only to the extent of the State's own jurisdiction. The independent
State, while part of international legal processes, is isolated in this other
significant respect.
The limits of the State's jurisdiction mark the limits of the zone
within which (national) law may require cost-spreading. The independ-
ent State is a community under no laws except international law and its
own law, and the former seems unlikely to compel other communities to
render assistance. Accession to independence thus has consequences for
the capability of the State to weather the vicissitudes that any given terri-
torial community may face. If the practice of the United Nations in so
readily admitting States to membership has encouraged the accession of
so many communities to independence then, perhaps, admission is the
act which has led the new States to exist in such legal exposure.
259. The ILC in 2007 appointed Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina Special Rapporteur for
the topic of "[pirotection of persons in the event of disaster." 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11,
375. The topic had been added to the ILC agenda that year. G.A. Res. 62/66, 7, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/62/66 (Jan. 8, 2008). The Special Rapporteur for the topic of the law of the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses considered, under the heading "water-related
hazards and dangers," the distinction between man-made and natural disasters. ILC, Fifth
Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, In 3-4, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/421 (May 19, 1989) (prepared by Stephen C. McCaffrey).
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The legal exposure of very small States is particularly acute. A hypo-
thetical case is that of the Small Island Developing State (SIDS) in the
face of climate change.' 6 The risk exists that rising sea levels will injure
many States in the SIDS category; it may already have begun to do so.
The injury in certain cases, such as the Federated States of Micronesia,
the Marshal Islands, the Maldives, and the Bahamas could amount to the
total loss of national territory (if sea level increase were to turn out to be
as significant as pessimistic forecasts say). If the affected territory were
part of a larger national legal system, then that system could adopt com-
pulsory measures to assist the inhabitants and thus to mitigate the
consequences of the harm. As a State, however, such territory would
have to rely upon whatever compulsory measures its own legislature
adopted. These would serve scarcely any use in face of the total loss of
the material base of the national society. The situation perhaps reflects a
gap in international humanitarian law.
4. Access to the International Court of Justice
Only States may be parties to cases before the ICJ, 26' but it is not
necessary to be a Member State of the United Nations in order to be a
party to a case. Before admission to the United Nations, a State may be-
come a party to the statute of the ICJ, and in this way may be a party to a
case in the ICJ: the Court "shall be open to the states Parties to the ...
Statute.,262
Becoming a party to the Statute, for a non-Member State, is by way
of action taken under Charter Article 93(2), meaning "on conditions to
be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recom-
mendation of the Security Council." Switzerland was the first to become
a party to the Statute without first having been admitted as a Member
State to the United Nations. Acting under Article 93(2), the General As-
sembly determined
Switzerland will become a party to the Statute of the Court on
the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of an instrument, signed on behalf of the Government of
Switzerland and ratified as may be required by Swiss constitu-
tional law, containing:
260. See Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States, Bridgetown, Barb., Apr. 6-25, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.167/9 (Oct. 1, 1994); The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: A Development Strategy for Island De-
veloping Countries, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/49/227 (July 18, 1994).
For more recent initiatives, see Small Islands Developing States Network,
http://www.sidsnet.org/SIDSDay-Index.html (last visited July 7, 2009).
261. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
262. Id. art. 35(1).
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(a) Acceptance of the provisions of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice;
(b) Acceptance of all the obligations of a Member of the United
Nations under Article 94 of the Charter;
(c) An undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the Court
such equitable amount as the General Assembly shall assess
from time to time after consultation with the Swiss Govern-
ment."'
Japan, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Nauru later became parties to the
Statute in the same way.264 The conditions for each were the same as for
Switzerland.265 When conditions were set for Switzerland to become a
party to the Statute, a Security Council Committee of Experts empha-
sized however that the conditions for one State under Article 93(2) are
not necessarily the same as for another: "[T]he conditions recommended
above as appropriate to the case of Switzerland are not intended to con-
stitute a precedent to be followed either by the Security Council or by
the General Assembly in any future case under Article 93, paragraph 2,
of the Charter.!21 In practice, the "conditions recommended" did not
change, and one might conclude, therefore, after a half century that a
precedent has been established. The plain language of Charter Article 93,
paragraph 2 nevertheless remains.
Writers have said that the universality of the United Nations removes
the possibility of a non-Member State seeking to become a party to the
Statute; as such, Article 93(2) is unlikely again to be called into use. The
situation of "new States com[ing] into existence without applying for
membership in the United Nations," wrote Karin Oellers-Frahm in 2006,
"seems to be rather hypothetical. 2 67 The declaration of independence of
Kosovo in the face of objections of permanent members of the Security
Council perhaps makes the situation rather less hypothetical.
It is also possible for a State neither a Member State of the United
Nations nor a party to the Statute of the ICJ to be party to a case. Article
35(2) of the Statute provides as follows:
263. Conditions on Which Switzerland May Become a Party to the International Court
of Justice, G.A. Res. 91 (I), at 15, U.N. Doc. AIRES/91 (I) (Dec. I1, 1946).
264 Karin Oellers-Frahm, Article 93 UN Charter, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 153, 157 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds.,
2006).
265. Id. at 153, 157 n.23.
266. Report and Recommendation of the Committee of Experts of the Security Council
Concerning the Conditions on Which Switzerland May Become a Party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, G.A. Res. 91 (I), Annex 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/9 1(I)/Annex
(Dec. 11, 1946) [hereinafter UN Report on Switzerland].
267. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 264, at 158.
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The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other
States shall, subject to the special provisions contained in trea-
ties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no
case shall such conditions place the parties in a position of ine-
quality before the Court.
The clause "the special provisions contained in treaties in force" has
been limited, "without any textual warrant," to treaties in force in 1945,
so its practical significance is small, if any remains at all.2 68 Still opera-
tive is the phrase "conditions under which the Court shall be open to
other States ... shall be laid down by the Security Council." The Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 9 to lay down conditions pursuant to
Article 35(2):
The International Court of Justice shall be open to a State which
is not a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
upon the following condition, namely, that such State shall pre-
viously have deposited with the Registrar of the Court a
declaration by which it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the
terms and subject to the conditions of the Statute and Rules of
the Court, and undertakes to comply in good faith with the deci-
sion or decisions of the Court and to accept all the obligations of
a Member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Char-
ter.
2 69
Resolution 9 is the instrument that operationalizes Article 35(2) of the
Statute. 7°
All Member States of the United Nations are "ipso facto parties to
the Statute."27' For States not members of the United Nations, the exist-
ing conditions for gaining access to the ICJ are not as stringent as the
criteria for being admitted to the United Nations. This is the effect of
Charter Article 93(2), Statute Article 35(2), and associated practice. A
State under Charter Article 93(2) or Security Council Resolution 9 gains
268. Crawford & Grant, supra note 153, at 207 n. 10.
269. S.C. Res. 9, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/9 (Oct. 15, 1946) [hereinafter Resolution 9].
270. Id. Resolution 9 also provides that a State making a declaration under its terms may
accept compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 paragraph 2. Id. However, the State so accept-
ing compulsory jurisdiction puts itself on a different footing from a Member State having
accepted compulsory jurisdiction: Resolution 9 provides that "such acceptance may not, with-
out explicit agreement, be relied upon vis-a-vis States parties to the Statute which have made
the declaration in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2"' Id. T 2. For reconciliation of this
difference to the equality provision of Article 35, paragraph 2, see Andreas Zimmermann,
Article 35, in STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY, supra
note 264, at 565, 585-86.
271. U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1.
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access to the Court by affirming its commitment to the ICJ Statute and to
Article 94 of the Charter (and by assuming certain financial obligations).
The conditions were therefore the same for non-Member States seeking
to become parties to the Statute, and for non-Statute States seeking ac-
cess to the Court. Setting a uniform set of conditions apparently was
intended.272
Yet, as pointed out above, notwithstanding consistent practice, it was
not the Charter that determined the conditions for Switzerland to become
party to the Statute. The General Assembly determined the conditions
acting on the recommendation of the Security Council under Charter
Article 93(2). Different conditions could be set in a future case. The
conditions set out in Security Council Resolution 9 are expressly appli-
cable to all States seeking access under Statute Article 35(2)-but only
for so long as Resolution 9 remains in effect. Those conditions, too,
then, are not necessarily permanent. The Security Council in Resolution
9
reserves the right to rescind or amend this resolution by a resolu-
tion which shall be communicated to the Court, and on receipt of
such communication and to the extent determined by the new
resolution, existing declarations shall cease to be effective ex-
cept in regard to disputes which are already before the Court.2 73
Neither the Charter nor the Statute specify what the scope of the condi-
tions for participation by non-Member States might be. As noted, the
existing conditions for a non-U.N. Member State to gain access to the
ICJ are not as stringent as the criteria for being admitted to the United
Nations. The non-U.N. member, whether seeking access by way of ac-
cession to the Statute or under Statute Article 35(2), does so by affirming
its commitment to the ICJ Statute and to Article 94 of the Charter (and
by assuming certain financial obligations). The Article 94 commitment
well may entail other commitments under the Charter. The Committee of
Experts said,
the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under Article
94 include the complementary obligations arising under Articles
25 and 103 of the Charter insofar as the provisions of those Arti-
cles may relate to the provisions of Article 94, and non-members
of the United Nations which become parties to the Statute (and
non-parties which have access to the Court) become bound by
these complementary obligations under Articles 25 and 103 in
relation to the provisions of Article 94 (but not otherwise), when
272. UN Report on Switzerland, supra note 266, Annex 4.
273. Resolution 9, supra note 269, T 4.
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they accept "all the obligations of a Member of the United Na-
tions under Article 94 .''74
However, this is only part of the total obligation that the U.N. Charter
imposes upon Member States. The requirement of Charter Article 4(1)
that, to be admitted, a State "accept the obligations contained in the pre-
sent Charter" means that the State must accept all the obligations. The
non-Member State seeking access to the ICJ plainly does not need to do
as much-at least under the current (and now half-century long) disposi-
tion. The commitment to Article 94 for purposes of gaining access to the
ICJ thus is an abridged version of the full commitment required under
Article 4(1) of the Charter for purposes of admission to the United Na-
tions. The less stringent requirements for ICJ participation reflect the
goal of achieving universal subscription to the principle that interna-
tional disputes are to be resolved by pacific means.
It is not immediately clear whether any constitutional provision
would prevent the General Assembly under Charter Article 93(2) or the
Security Council under Statute Article 35(2) from deciding that the non-
Member State must satisfy more stringent conditions. Hypothetically, the
General Assembly and the Security Council may be divided as to the
role to give a State in U.N. processes, the Security Council veto prevent-
ing admission to the United Nations, but a General Assembly majority
favoring the State. It would seem that the definition of a Security Coun-
cil "recommendation" under Charter Article 4(2), as affirmed in the
Competence Advisory Opinion, again would apply if a dispute arose as
to the meaning of the same term under Charter Article 93(2). A conceiv-
able-though, again, hypothetical-bargain would be the Security
Council requiring as a condition for access to the Court even more strin-
gent conditions than those for admission to membership set down in
Article 4(1).275 The State presumably would be free to reject such terms
and seek adjudication elsewhere.
The provisions of the U.N. Charter, ICJ Statute, and Security Coun-
cil Resolution 9 under which States are given standing before the Court
would appear straightforward. One of the main preliminary questions
likely to arise in an ICJ proceeding is the question of the consent of a
State to jurisdiction-for example, a question as to the effectiveness or
scope of a compromissory clause for purposes of Article 36(1) of the
274. UN Report on Switzerland, supra note 266, Annex 4.
275. That the conditions for access to the Court by non-Member States may vary upon
decision of the competent U.N. organs prompts comparison to the accession provisions of the
European Union under Title VII, Art 0 (Final Provisions) of the Treaty on European Union.
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1757 U.N.T.S. 4, 156. The E.U. accession provi-
sions, too, may be varied from one applicant to another; but unlike the conditions for access to
the Court, they actually have been varied considerably in practice.
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Statute.276 But this assumes clarity as to the prior matter-namely, the
relation to the United Nations of the State seeking access to the Court.
The relation of Yugoslavia to the United Nations in the 1990s was any-
thing but clear, and that State was engaged, both as respondent and
applicant, in multiple cases in the Court. The ambiguity of the relation
between the United Nations and Yugoslavia (later titled Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) has received extensive attention from writers . The matter did
not have to be settled where jurisdiction was lacking."' Where the prob-
lem of U.N. membership was not easily avoided, the approaches adopted
were not entirely satisfactory. It still may be asked whether the Court in
2004 in truth needed to take as categorical a position as it did on the
membership question. From the position that international disputes are to
be settled by pacific means, perhaps it follows that the United Nations is
obliged to facilitate access to the Court; this would suggest that non-
admission could constitute a breach, or, at least, that failure to seek paths
to standing before the Court could do so.
5. Admission and State Creation
An interpretation of the Charter that readily admits new States to the
United Nations may give impetus to the creation of new States, which in
turn may generally affect public order. Insofar as some of the effects are
deleterious, one might ask whether responsibility arises from admission.
One of the international public goods that a new State most seeks is
U.N. membership.79 U.N. membership, by the logic of the Charter, is
conclusive as to the statehood of the entity admitted-a point on which
210the ICJ was clear in the Bosnian Genocide case. Membership brings
276. See Christian Tomuschat, Article 36, in STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY, supra note 264, at 588, 612-26.
277. See, e.g., Vojin Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, The Strange Story of the Bosnian
Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 65, 81-82 (2008); cf Yehuda Z. Blum, Was Yugoslavia
a Member of the United Nations in the Years 1992-2000?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 800, 818
(2007).
278. For example, in the NATO cases, the United States had not consented to jurisdiction
under Article 38(5) of the Rules of Court, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J.
916, 925 (June 2); and Spain was not subject to compulsory jurisdiction because it had made a
valid reservation as to reciprocity under Article 36(2) of the Statute, Legality of Use of Force
(Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 761, 770-71 (June 2).
279. See Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under
International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 35-36 (2000) (discussing some of the
general problems for a putative State for being excluded from the United Nations).
280. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 611 (July 11) ("The Court notes that
Bosnia and Herzegovina became a Member of the United Nations following the decisions
adopted on 22 May 1992 by the Security Council and the General Assembly, bodies
competent under the Charter. Article XI of the Genocide Convention opens it to 'any Member
of the United Nations'; from the time of its admission to the Organization, Bosnia and
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security; 21' it brings access to multilateral diplomacy;282  it brings
introductions to the network of global aid and credit institutions. 3
Membership is the starting point for inclusion in the international trade
284regime and for protection of intellectual property rights. The
significant involvement of the United Nations in maintenance of the
international security architecture, including even administration of
territory, is a project in which a State may participate more readily after
admission. 5 In light of the multiple dimensions of U.N. membership as
an international public good, if no substantive limit is placed on
admission, then the incentive for independence is increased. By contrast,
Herzegovina could thus become a party to the Convention. Hence the circumstances of its
accession to independence are of little consequence."). Yugoslavia, however, had argued that
the Bosnian declaration of independence was unlawful and thus Bosnia was not a State. See
Memorandum from Rodoljub Etinski, Agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Observations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Concerning the Requests for Indication of
Provisional Measures (Aug. 23, 1993), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/
13579.pdf (last visited June 13, 2009) ("The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contests the
legitimacy of the Applicant .... [The] secession of the 'Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina'
[was] carried out in contravention of the Constitution of this former Yugoslav Republic, as
well as the rules of international law."); see also id. app. 1, at 16 (setting out international
opinion that recognition of Bosnia was "premature"). The Yugoslav argument was confused by
its mixture of references to the statehood of Bosnia and the credentials of the Bosnian
government, which Yugoslavia argued also should have been rejected. Respecting the
competence of the Bosnian government, see Application of Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 622 (July 11)
("[A]t the time of the filing of the Application, Mr. Izetbegovic was recognized, in particular
by the United Nations, as the Head of State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.").
281. Consider the condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res.
678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2,
1990). To be sure, it is hard to conceive any other response to the unlawful invasion and forci-
ble annexation of a State-which suggests that the security of Kuwait in 1990-1991 may be
referred to its statehood. This still, if slightly less directly, refers security to U.N. admission,
for, as already noted, admission is conclusive of that status.
282. See DUGARD, supra note 80, at 77-78 (noting the function of the United Nations as
a center of multilateral diplomacy).
283. On the position of the IMF and World Bank within the U.N. system generally, see
Ngaire Woods, Bretton Woods Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS, supra note 153, at 233-53; see also Bartram S. Brown, IMF Governance, the Asian
Financial Crisis, and the New Financial Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-
COLD WAR WORLD: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF Li HAOPEI 131, 131-34 (Sienho Yee & Wang
Tieya eds., 2001). The question of State access to finance is not limited to international public
institutions. Private institutions are also unlikely to enter into credit relations with entities--or
with private parties within the territory of entities-whose international legal status is inse-
cure. This has been a consideration in seeking a resolution of the status of Kosovo.
284. Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 232, 239-58, 280-85 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
285. The States directly involved in discharging the U.N. mandate for Kosovo are U.N.
Member States. States administering territories under Trusteeship agreements also were U.N.
members, at least in most (but not all) cases. The exception was Italy in its administration of
Somaliland. See GRANT, supra note *, at 265-66.
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if the United Nations were to make clear that more is needed to obtain
admission than a mere assertion of eligibility, then this would introduce
a decelerating mechanism. Slowing the steps to independence in turn
would present the possibility that greater prudence be exercised in taking
those steps. Communities would not take admission for granted and,
perhaps, in considering the possibility that they would remain outsiders
to the principal international organization, they would be less precipitous
in a decision to establish statehood. Nor would existing States
necessarily encourage the independence of others, as for example Russia
did toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia in and after August 2008.86
(Though, it must be said, Russian policy-makers today would have to
possess the most sanguine expectations of other members of the Security
Council, if they reckon these entities to stand any chance of being
admitted.) The problem of "failed States"-perhaps better termed a
problem of failed governments287-has not generally been recognized as
bearing relation to the admission practice of the United Nations; but a
relation-even a fairly strong relation-may be posited. If the relation is
accepted as significant, then it might give further grounds for attributing
responsibility in connection with admission.
B. Remoteness of the Injury
This brings us back to the problem of causation. The matters ad-
dressed above are all consequences of admission of States to the United
Nations. However, as the ILC said in its Commentary to ARSIWA Arti-
cle 31, "the subject matter of reparation is, globally, the injury resulting
from and ascribable to the wrongful act, rather than any and all conse-
quences flowing from an internationally wrongful act.,,28' The question
this Article addresses is whether admission entails responsibility such
that a new obligation arises to make reparation. To spur the breakup of
286. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 1 14, 15 (Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 140 (Oct. 15).
287. The terminology of "failed States" and "state failure" is widely used. See, e.g.,
GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFECTIVENESS: LEGAL LESSONS FROM
THE DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2004); Robert Jennings, Sovereignty and
International Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note
25, at 27, 30. But the terminology is problematic, not least of all for implying that it is the
inhabitants of the States concerned who are principally to blame. Crawford, supra note 26, at
718-23. The expression in the Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Opera-
tions, 33 I.L.M. 795 (1994), though less memorable, is more accurate: "the collapse of
governmental authority in some states." Id; cf Jean Charpentier, Le Phinomne Etatique o
Travers les Grandes Mutations Politiques Contemporaines, in SOCI T" FRAN4AISE POUR LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL L'TAT SOUVERAIN A L'AUBE DU XXIE SIECLE COLLOQUE DE NANCY
25-27 (1994) (referencing the "failed state" as a case of "degradation of internal sover-
eignty").
288. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, at 204.
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States into new States could endanger international peace and security
and would be contrary to the U.N. Charter, but creating a new State is
not in itself a wrongful act. And to the extent that admission of States is
an impulse to State creation, admission is that much further removed
from the possible breach. Though a State might seek the cover of mem-
bership in an international organization to evade responsibility for a
wrongful act, such misuse of membership also seems rather removed
from the decision to admit the State. The confirmatory effect of admis-
sion on statehood likewise would be difficult, if not impossible, to
characterize as a wrong in itself, except, perhaps, in an extreme case,
where the putative State has been brought into existence for unlawful
purposes and admission would tend to further these or to obstruct efforts
to counteract them. Insofar as admission facilitates the pacific settlement
of international disputes by giving the new member automatic access to
the ICJ, admission is quite the opposite of a wrongful act.
Thus the consequences of admission of a State to the United Na-
tions, if they are to be taken as injurious at all, are consequences
connected to admission only through a chain of causation. It is doubtful
whether admission is close enough to any injurious consequences to
support a claim that admission in a particular case has given rise to inju-
ries for which reparation is due.
Relevant when considering the issue of causation is the distinction
between an act and its effects. The provision which the ILC drafted rela-
tive to extension in time of the breach of an international obligation
(draft article 10) says in part as follows: "The breach of an international
obligation by an act ... not having a continuing character occurs at the
moment when the act is performed, even if its effects continue."2 9 Ad-
mission of a State to the United Nations, whatever its other legal
characteristics and however extensive its effects, is "an act ... not hav-
ing a continuing character." Admission takes place by a series of
decisions pursuant to a constitutional process, and the decisions are fixed
in time and the timing of their effectiveness specified. Indeed, Rule 138
of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, as amended, makes
clear that it is upon the affirmative vote of the General Assembly that the
candidate for admission is admitted. Membership, by contrast, is a phe-
nomenon that continues from the time of admission. It is admission's
most obvious effect.
The ILC was clear that an act (including an act amounting to a
breach) and its effects are separate things:
289. 2005 ILC Report, supra note 52, 9 206, at 91, draft art. 10(1) (emphasis added)
(addressing responsibility of international organizations). ARSIWA Art 14(1) contains the
same language with respect to state responsibility. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, at 63.
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An act does not have a continuing character merely because its
effects or consequences extend in time. It must be the wrongful
act as such which continues. In many cases of internationally
wrongful acts, their consequences may be prolonged. The pain
and suffering caused by earlier acts of torture or the economic
effects of the expropriation of property continue even though the
torture has ceased or title to the property has passed. Such con-
sequences are the subject of the secondary obligations of
reparation, including restitution .... The prolongation of such
effects will be relevant, for example, in determining the amount
of compensation payable. They do not, however, entail that the
breach itself is a continuing one.
The ILC thus took account of the possibility that not all effects of a
breach will be immediately proximate in time to the breach. The ILC
suggests that the causal connection between the wrongful act and its in-
jurious effects need not be extremely close to support a claim for
reparation. Indeed, a party may claim reparation for relatively remote
harm. This however is not a general provision respecting causation.
Draft article 34 and its corresponding provision in ARSIWA (Article
31) address causation more directly but do not offer significantly more
guidance as to a standard of causation. Under draft article 34(1), which
follows ARSIWA Article 31 mutatis mutandis, the obligation is to make
"full" reparation for the injury "caused by" the wrongful act (the wrong-
ful act being the breach of an obligation resulting from an act or
omission attributable to the organization)."' That the injury includes
"any damage, whether material or moral" suggests a wide scope for the
definition, 292 which may therefore imply that reparation is due not only
for injuries very immediate to the wrongful act, but also for injuries less
proximate to the act. This much is suggested by draft article 10(1) and
ARSIWA Article 14(1). The difficulty is to formulate a more refined
definition of the relevant scope.
State practice and the decisions of arbitral tribunals afford the best
evidence of a standard of causation. They tend to illustrate not one, but
multiple standards. Comment (10) to ARSIWA Article 31 sets out the
range of definitions:
290. Id. T 6, at 136. In some instances, it may be a matter of appreciation to distinguish
between an act having a continuing character and the ongoing effects of an act. Id. 8-13, at
137-39. The question is, where does the act end and its effects begin?
291. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, T 344, at 203.
292. See id. draft art. 34(2) ("Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral,
caused by the internationally wrongful act of an international organization.").
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Various terms are used to describe the link which must exist
between the wrongful act and the injury in order for the
obligation of reparation to arise. For example, reference may be
made to losses "attributable [to the wrongful act] as a proximate
cause", or to damage which is "too indirect, remote, and
uncertain to be appraised", or to "any direct loss, damage,
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and
corporations as a result of' the wrongful act. Thus causality in
fact is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reparation.
There is a further element, associated with the exclusion of
injury that is too "remote" or "consequential" to be the subject
of reparation. In some cases, the criterion of "directness" may be
used, in others "foreseeability" or "proximity". But other factors
may also be relevant: for example, whether State organs
deliberately caused the harm in question, or whether the harm
caused was within the ambit of the rule which was breached,
having regard to the purpose of that rule. In other words, the
requirement of a causal link is not necessarily the same in
relation to every breach of an international obligation. In
international as in national law, the question of remoteness of
damage "is not a part of the law which can be satisfactorily
solved by search for a single verbal formula." The notion of a
sufficient causal link which is not too remote is embodied in the
general requirement in article 31 that the injury should be in
consequence of the wrongful act, but without the addition of any
particular qualifying phrase.293
It is scarcely plausible that the United Nations, in admitting a State to
membership, "deliberately" caused any harm that might result from that
act. It could be, in the sense of Comment (10), that "the harm caused
was within the ambit of the rule which was breached, having regard to
the purpose of that rule." The obligation of the United Nations with re-
spect to international peace and security, if some of the pleadings in the
Admission case are considered and the dissenting judges' analysis ac-
cepted, is an obligation "within the ambit" of the admission provisions
of the Charter. Admission wrongfully granted, under that analysis, would
include admission that threatens or breaches peace and security.
It may be that other elements beside the proximity of an act to a
given harm come into play when considering causality. A case in which
the elements of obligation, breach, and attribution are extremely clear
293. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, 10, at 204-05.
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may be one in which a tribunal is readier to construe the phrase "not too
remote"294 liberally-that is, to determine that the obligation to make
reparation relates to an extensive scope of effects, even comparatively
remote ones. A case in which the other elements have been determined
as very close questions, by contrast, might be one in which a tribunal
would "describe the link which must exist between the wrongful act and
the injury" 291 more restrictively. Yet it presents a risk of excessive judicial
license to decide an element of a case without articulating a self-
contained reason. The problem of causation is not easily solved. The
consequences of admission of a State, except perhaps in exceptional
cases, are likely to be too remote to establish the causal connection to
admission requisite to support a claim for reparation.
Reparation, because it forms a distinct phase in the process of claim,
nevertheless merits consideration with respect to admission of States.
VI. REPARATION
France, in the Sixth (Legal) Committee, said, "[t]he jurisprudence of
the Chorz6w Factory case should apply as much to international organi-
zations as to States. 29 6 This means that international organizations
should be subject to the maxim, as much as are States, that every in-
stance of international responsibility entails a duty to make reparation in
some form.297 Giorgio Gaja, as Special Rapporteur on responsibility of
international organizations, said that it "would be absurd to exempt in-
ternational organizations from facing reparation as the consequence of
their internationally wrongful acts. This would be tantamount to saying
that international organizations would be entitled to ignore their obliga-
tions under international law.
'29
Several matters arise in connection with reparation. The sections
above already have discussed problems concerning the identity of the
relevant party and the causal link between possible injurious conse-
quences of admission to the United Nations and the decision to admit.
This section considers, if the act admitting a State to membership had




296. Fifth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 108, 21, at 8 (quoting U.N.
GAOR, 61st Sess., 14th plen. mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/61I/SR.14 (Oct. 30, 2006)).
297. Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, at 15 (July 26); see
also Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96
Am. J. INT'L L. 833, 835-36 (2002).
298. Fifth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 108, 22, at 8.
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A. Reparation in the ILC Draft Articles
The Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations,
like ARSIWA, address in some detail the content of international respon-
sibility-including especially reparation for injury and the several forms
it might take. Draft articles 31 through 36 address general principles.
Draft articles 37 through 43 address reparation and its forms.
The injured party in many cases will seek cessation of the wrongful
act and, as provided under draft article 33, "appropriate assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition." Comment (2) to draft article 33 notes that
cessation is often "the main object pursued."9 9 Admission of a State to
the United Nations, an act that takes place at a discrete time, does not
present a case where the injured party (if there is one) likely would de-
mand cessation. Ex hypothesi the United Nations might face a demand
from "the international community as a whole" that a continuing series
of decisions to admit States as members be stopped. But, it is not clear
who precisely would make the demand, and whether such decisions
would constitute for purposes of responsibility a single ongoing act is at
best debatable. It would seem not to, for each admission decision is a
constitutional act that by the terms of the Admission Advisory Opinion
takes place separately from others.3°° A demand for cessation therefore is
not very likely. A demand for non-repetition, perhaps, is conceivable:
some party might demand that the United Nations not repeat admissions
that conflict with the obligations of the Organization. The ILC Commen-
tary to draft article 33 observes that "[f]or [an] obligation [to offer
assurances of non-repetition] to arise, it is not necessary for the breach to
be continuing. The obligation seems justified especially when the con-
duct of the responsible entity shows a pattern of breaches."3°' The
definition of the term "pattern" however may not be easy to pin down. 2
299. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, 344, at 202.
300. Conditions of Admission of State for Membership in United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 64-65 (May 28).
301. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, 344, at 202; id. draft art. 33 cmt. 3.
302. How to establish that breaches have such a relation to one another to constitute a
"pattern" is a question arising in various fields. The question arises, for example, under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a U.S. federal statute, the phrase
in which "pattern of racketeering activity" has occasioned dispute. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (2000). Consider also Justice Scalia's criticism of the main definition the U.S. Supreme
Court had given the phrase:
[T]he word "pattern" in the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" was meant to
import some requirement beyond the mere existence of multiple predicate acts.
Thus, when § 1961(5) says that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity" it is describing what is needful but not sufficient. (If that were not the case,
the concept of "pattern" would have been unnecessary, and the statute could simply
have attached liability to "multiple acts of racketeering activity"). But what that
something more is, is beyond me. As I have suggested, it is also beyond the Court.
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As to forms of reparation, draft article 37 (in the same terms as
ARSIWA Article 34) says as follows: "Full reparation for the injury
caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitu-
tion, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.' 303 The draft article there-
fore reflects the accepted conception that reparation may take one or a
combination of three forms: (i) restitution, (ii) compensation, or (iii) sat-
isfaction. Draft articles 38 through 40 develop the three forms of
reparation seriatim.
1. Restitution
Draft article 38 defines restitution as "to re-establish the situation
which existed before the wrongful act was committed." The ILC is clear
that the requirement to "re-establish the situation" is to be read nar-
rowly-that is to say, the requirement does not "absorb[] into the
concept of restitution other elements of full reparation ... tend[ing] to
conflate restitution as a form of reparation and the underlying obligation
of reparation itself."3°" Restitution means re-establishing the status quo
ante; but it does not go so far as to involve re-establishing "the situation
that would have existed if the wrongful act had not been committed."3 °5
This suggests an interest in confining restitution to the situation arising
immediately from the breach, rather than extending it to cover less
proximate results.
Admission of a State to the United Nations is an act that certainly
in principle the United Nations could reverse; this is the purpose of
Charter Article 6. Where admission had breached an obligation, one
therefore might speak of restitution. This would be analogous to "ju-
ridical restitution"-the "modification of a legal situation" where that
situation is in breach of an obligation.3°6 However, the United Nations
has never expelled a State. Article 6 scarcely even seems an operative
provision of the Charter. There exists something like a settlement (de-
veloped through practice) that, once admitted, a State is not to be
Today's opinion has added nothing to improve our prior guidance, which has cre-
ated a kaleidoscope of Circuit positions, except to clarify that RICO may in
addition be violated when there is a "threat of continuity." It seems to me this in-
creases rather than removes the vagueness.
H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
303. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, 344, at 208.
304. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, 2, at 213.
305. Id.
306. Id. 5, at214-15;seeid. at215nn.534-35.
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expelled-a constitutional variant of the agreements sometimes seen in
arbitrations that restitution is not an appropriate remedy.
307
Moreover, draft article 38 refers to two conditions limiting the re-
quirement to "reestablish the situation., 308 First, reestablishing the
situation must not be "materially impossible."3°0 Second, it must not "in-
volve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from
restitution instead of compensation. 3t0
Expulsion of a State from the United Nations, in a narrow sense, is
not "materially impossible." The constitutional mechanisms, though un-
used, do exist to effect that result. But expulsion on grounds of
"wrongful admission" could entail other consequences. On the text of
the Charter, statehood is a central criterion for admission. It is true that
admission does not make the State, so expulsion does not unmake it. Yet,
as also noted, the tendency exists to view U.N. admission as a certifica-
tion of statehood. It follows that the effects that might be inferred from
expulsion are significant.
A further consideration against restitution as a form of reparation is
that restitution could adversely affect the rights of third parties. This was
the consideration in the Forests of Central Rhodope case, where not only
had the condition of the forests changed since the respondent had wrong-
fully taken them, but various third parties had acquired rights in them."'
Any remedy to problems involving statehood, which tends to negate a
particular State (or extensively to curtail core incidents of its interna-
tional status, for example, the right to exclusive jurisdiction over its
internal affairs) has serious consequences-for States have entered into
treaties or engaged in transactions with or in the State, and otherwise
have acted in reliance on its continued existence. To negate a State is not
a path through an open field, but rather into a more tangled thicket, and
so sometimes fashionable ideas about intervention, new forms of trustee-
ship, and the like may be as dubious as restitution of disputed forests.
Expulsion from the United Nations would not necessarily entail full ne-
gation of the State expelled, but it could be a first step; the rights of the
allied United Nations as against the "enemy States" in World War II and
307. See, e.g., Gov't of Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 66 I.L.R. 519, 533 (Int'l Arb. Trib.
1982), cited in ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, at 214; Walter Fletcher Smith (Cuba v.
U.S.), II R. Int'l Arb. Awards 913, 918 (Clarence Hale, Arbitrator 1929), cited in ILC COM-
MENTARIES, supra note 142, at 214.
308. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142.
309. Id. art. 38(a).
310. Id. art. 38(b).
311. Greece v. Bulgaria, III R. Int'l Arb Awards 1405, 1432 (1933) cited in ILC COm-
MENTARIES, supra note 142, 9, at 216; see also Judgement No. 97 (Oct. 4, 1965), Leak v.
Secretary-General, summarized at United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1965) pt. 2, ch. 5, at
208-09, cited in Fifth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 108, 43, at 13.
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immediately afterward suggest the direction that naturally would follow
from expulsion. Even avoiding such a radical claim against the auton-
omy of an expelled State, the cessation of membership itself would have
immediate effects, including disruption of the relations that likely will
have developed as between the State and other States in the framework
of the Organization.
2. Compensation
The first paragraph of draft article 39 would provide as follows:
"The international organization responsible for an internationally wrong-
ful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused
thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution."3 '2 The
clause "insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution" identi-
fies restitution as having priority over compensation. Returning the
situation to the status quo ante thus is the preferred form of reparation.
Draft article 39 acknowledges that restitution may not in all situations be
available or, where available, that it may not be adequate to make full
reparation.33 Paragraph 2 specifies that the relevant damages for assess-
ment of compensation will be "financially assessable," a phrase intended
"to exclude compensation for what is sometimes referred to as 'moral
damage.' 3,1 4 Compensation is not punitive."
The main cases of compensation made by the United Nations have
involved specific acts carried out under U.N. mandates. The ICJ in the
Cumaraswamy case suggested that, where the United Nations is respon-
sible, the United Nations is obligated to compensate "for any damages
incurred as a result of acts performed by the United Nations or by its
agents acting in their official capacity. '316 There is little, if any evidence,
that the United Nations or other international organizations would have
an obligation to make compensation for the more remote effects of pol-
icy. Thus, for example, it was not the long-term problems of the Congo
for which the United Nations paid compensation but, rather, specific in-
juries resulting directly from specific acts arising out of the U.N.
operation in the Congo." A fortiori even more remote effects of admis-
sion of a State would not be compensable, at least under the law of
responsibility as it now exists.
312. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, 344, at 209.
313. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, 3, at 218-19.
314. ld. 11, at 218.
315. Id. 4, at 219.
316. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of Special Rapporteur of
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 88 (Apr. 29).
317. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 11, at 209-10, draft art. 38 cmt. 1.
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3. Satisfaction
Satisfaction, the third form of reparation treated in the draft articles,
characteristically involves "an apology or an expression of regret. 38 The
ILC Commentary to draft article 40 suggests as one example of satisfac-
tion on the part of an international organization the apology by NATO
for the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.3 9 The Commen-
tary also notes the statements in the U.N. Secretary-General's reports
concerning Srebrenica and Rwanda, expressing, respectively, "deepest
regret and remorse" and "bitter[] regret. 320 There would be no obvious
point to apologizing for, or expressing regret over, admission of a State.
Indeed, it is scarcely conceivable that an organization would do so with
respect to one of its members. Injuries resulting from admission would
not be compensable by satisfaction.
B. Reparation in Practice?
As considered above, impediments exist to treating admission of a
State to the United Nations as a wrongful act for which reparation might
be demanded. That in principle the law of responsibility could apply to
admission does not necessarily mean that it actually would. The question
would arise whether States or international organizations in practice
have acted to implement responsibility in this field.
Two areas of international practice possibly relevant for present pur-
poses are international development assistance and intervention. Both
development assistance and intervention might be seen as measures
taken to meet an obligation toward certain admitted States. The General
Assembly has addressed development in extenso and from time to time
has suggested that it could be evolving into a right. 2 ' It also has formu-
lated a "responsibility to protect," which would suggest, but does not
create, an obligation to intervene under certain conditions.322 If develop-
ment assistance and intervention were to become obligatory on the part
of those in a position to perform them, and if they then were to be char-
acterized in a framework of international responsibility, then they might
further be characterized as reparation. Many States that receive devel-
opment assistance, whether in the form of grants or credit, are
comparatively new States, including new States admitted to the United
Nations during the heyday of decolonization from the mid-1950s
318. Id. at 211, draft art. 40 cmt. 1.
319. Id. at 212, draft art. 40 cmt. 4.
320. Id. draft art. 40 cmts. 2-3.
321. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 27, IN 15-56; Declaration on the
Right to Development, supra note 27.
322. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 27, 1$ 138-39.
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through the 1960s. 323 Many States that are the subject of international
intervention belong to the same category. Significant international prac-
tice exists in the field of development assistance, and there are numerous
cases of more direct forms of intervention. The point here is not to re-
view the practice; writers have considered it in detail.324 The point instead
is to ask whether acts done in the fields of development assistance and
intervention constitute evidence of substantive obligations with respect
to newly created (and newly admitted) States.
Failed government, or government in breach of basic obligations to
its citizens, has been identified as a ground for intervention .1 5 Domestic
jurisdiction is presumptively exclusive as against international interven-
tion, and Article 2(7) of the Charter enshrines this position, which was
well-established in customary international law as well. Notwithstanding
Article 2(7), interventions have taken place on the asserted legal basis
that a responsibility-or perhaps a right--exists to intervene to correct
failings in government. Any use of force by a State or international or-
ganization against a State is a serious matter for international peace and
security. The phenomenon of the failed government, whatever its inde-
terminacy, therefore is significant for the law concerning international
peace and security.
Intervention to "repair" or "correct" failed governments has been
proposed (and carried out) under more than one formula. Conspicuous
cases of intervention actually executed, such as Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, have replaced governments that did not respect the basic rights of
the people. Other interventions, such as in Haiti and the Solomon Is-
lands, have aimed to restore government where it has broken down, been
unlawfully displaced, or altogether disappeared. Yet in spite of the seri-
ous questions intervention raises-or perhaps because of the
323. Consider, for example, the intensive activity of the United Nations in States in Af-
rica south of the Sahara, all but three of which gained independence during the main period of
decolonization. UNDP-Africa, http://www.undp.org/africa/ (last visited June 13, 2009).
324. On armed intervention, see, for example, HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & JUSTIN MORRIS,
REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (2000); GEORG NOLTE, EINGREIFEN
AUF EINLADUNG: ZUR VOSLKERRECHTLICHEN ZULASSIGKEIT DES EINSATZES FREMDER
TRUPPEN IM INTERNEN KONFLIKT AUF EINLADUNG DER REGIERUNG 392-95, 409-18 (2000);
see also THOMAS JAYE, ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY, STRATEGY, AND SECURITY IN THE ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) INTERVENTION IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL
WAR 139-263 (2003); PEACE KEEPING AS A SECURITY STRATEGY IN AFRICA: CHAD AND LI-
BERIA AS CASE STUDIES (Margaret A. Vogt & L. Salawu Aminu eds., 1996).
325. See Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 23, 29 (1999) (saying that intervention may be justified where there have been
committed "large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and constituting a
threat to the peace").
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intractability of those questions-no generally applicable legal theory
has been articulated on which all such interventions might be based.
A number of theories exist. Consent by the government of the State
subject to intervention is a sound theory, where one can convincingly
apply it.326 Although for all States domestic jurisdiction is presumptively
inviolable, any State may waive its monopoly in favor of a foreign inter-
vening power. The European Commission, referring to its program of
support for the electoral systems in developing democracies, said that
consent is "of vital importance for the European Union's external rela-
tions activities, which could otherwise be seen as undue interference in
the domestic affairs of third States"327 However, a State or international
organization can apply this theory only where good evidence exists that
the State targeted for intervention has freely given its consent. Obtaining
such evidence often will be the problem. Consent is difficult to ascertain
where the government has ceased to function. And it is, again, where
government has ceased to function-or functions in breach of basic ob-
ligations and is unlikely to stop of its own accord-that calls go up for
intervention.
Another legal basis for intervention is that the rules protecting basic
human dignity have developed to the point that national boundaries no
longer insulate offenders from international law. This reflects the shift of
international law toward greater cognizance and protection of the indi-
vidual. But, notwithstanding the increased status of the individual under
international law, States remain the principal legal persons at interna-
tional level and, apart from rare exceptions, advances in international
human rights law are rooted in the consent of a State to be bound by a
relevant instrument. The increase in substantive and procedural protec-
tions for individuals within national boundaries has been generally
consistent, then, with the traditional understanding of the autonomy of
the State. Human rights law, if it continues to gain leverage, someday
may exist independent of the consent of the States subject to it. But, for
now, as a basis for intervention in cases of failed government, the human
326. The practice to 1999 is considered in NOLTE, supra note 324; see ILC, Fourth Re-
port on Responsibility of International Organizations, 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/564 (Feb. 28,
2006) (prepared by Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter Fourth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja] ("A
recent example is Indonesia's invitation to the European Union, contributing countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore, and Thailand), Norway, and Switzerland, for deployment of an Aceh Monitoring
Mission.").
327. 2007 Comments, supra note 31, at 15; see also The Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genu-
ine Elections, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/49/675/Corr. 1 (Nov. 30, 1994);
R. Sapienza, Considerazioni sulle Attivita di Assistenza e Monitoraggio Elettorale dell'ONU,
in 88 RiVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 647 (2005), cited in Fourth Report of Special
Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 326, 12, at 4 n.10.
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rights regime tends to meet the same limit-namely, consent of the State
concerned.
Another theory is that the rights of certain States are not equal to the
rights of others. A sort of "quasi-sovereignty" or "semi-statehood" is
said to exist, where government is deficient in the sense(s) indicated.
Whatever its other qualities, this theory is distinctive, in that it does not
rely (initially or ultimately) on the consent of the State in which the in-
tervention takes place. If conserving basic principles of the legal system
is a policy objective, then this is the most problematic theory of interven-
tion. It invites the following response, which, in turn, leads back to the
main consideration of the present Article: if existing States have ap-
proved the admission of a given "failed State" into the United Nations,
then they have ipso facto accepted it as a State for all purposes of inter-
national law, and their acceptance has been communicated in an
authoritative statement which scarcely can be qualified, much less repu-
diated, without casting doubt on that most fundamental rule that one's
commitments are to be honored. Where the United Nations has managed
or overseen long-term projects of assistance, such as in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and in Cambodia, this has taken place with the formal consent
of the beneficiary. The United Nations has never imposed trusteeship on
a State. Article 78 of the Charter in any case makes clear that such an
arrangement is not available for a Member State. 8 Indeed it would be
paradoxical to say that an obligation to maintain and consolidate state-
hood is to be satisfied by intervention. To take over core functions of the
State without its consent would derogate statehood. Intervention is not
readily explicable as a form of reparation for inducing the accession to
independence of "unprepared" or "unready" States.
Then, perhaps, development assistance could be categorized as repa-
ration. As noted above, development assistance, including through
various international agencies-for example, the IMF and United Na-
tions Development Programme-is an established part of international
practice. The General Assembly, as noted, has adopted statements con-
cerning development, but the texts are non-binding and at most point to
general principles.
As such, little, if any evidence exists that States have ongoing af-
firmative obligations to give assistance once they have voted to admit an
entity as a U.N. member. By their vote in favor of admission they cer-
tainly have expressed their view that the entity is a State for purposes of
international law. There are jus cogens prohibitions, but these apply,
largely if not in whole, whether or not a community is a State. What is
328. See Dietrich Rauschning, Article 78, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
supra note 90, at 1117, 1117-18.
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perhaps distinctive about the vote of admission is that it signifies the
judgment of the voting Member State (reached by whatever internal
process) that the candidate has the ability to fulfill the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. Admission signifies the same, as to the
judgment of the Organization as a whole. Assuming that one of the prin-
ciples of the United Nations is that internal public order should be
maintained (at least at a level necessary for basic human dignity), then
the voting Member State and the Organization have made a representa-
tion that the candidate is capable of respecting that principle. In some
circumstances, a representation may have the effect of estoppel on the
party making it.
Transfers of wealth in the form of international aid and credit, and
the numerous interventions undertaken to restore or to build public order
in States with failed or failing governments might be described as a sort
of tacit reparation. It comes as little surprise, however, that States, when
they give aid to or intervene in underdeveloped States, do not express the
view that they are obliged to do so. Even where damages are directly
connected to certain conduct, States have resisted acknowledging re-
sponsibility. 29 For example, the Soviet Union made an ex gratia payment
to Canada in connection with the crash of a radioactive satellite on Ca-
nadian territory.330 The payment equaled a significant part of what
Canada had claimed-roughly half-but the Soviet Union would not
accept that this was compensation for a wrongful act."' States would all
the more resist acknowledging very general obligations with respect to
the maintenance and consolidation of the independence of new States.
To characterize the various projects of "State building" (or rebuilding) as
reparations would import a mandatory element into that practice, which
would be entirely unacceptable to the most active States. The main pro-
posed addition to international legal principles in the field of restoring
public order in States with weak governments therefore has not been by
way of assertions that responsibility might attach to States for their own
actions taken-for example, Security Council votes affirming fitness
under Article 4(1). The "responsibility to protect" puts the emphasis in-
329. Fifth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 108, 25, at 9.
330. For an inventory of satellite debris collected, see Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Note Verbale Dated 19 December 1978from the Permanent Representative of Canada
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/236/Annex
(Dec. 22, 1978).
331. See Protocol on Settlement of Canada's Claim for Damages Caused by "Cosmos
954" Can.-U.S.S.R., Apr. 2, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 689 (1981); ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note
142, 13, at 222-23. Consider also the position of the sending States comprising IFOR and
SFOR in the former Yugoslavia, which "have taken it upon themselves to settle any claims for
damages, at the same time.. . disclaiming all legal liability." 2005 Comments, supra note 146,
at 63 (comment of Germany).
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stead on conduct within the underdeveloped State-after all, such a "re-
sponsibility" implies protection from something; all the better for the
protecting States that it not be from their own past decisions.
Serious questions prior to reparations remain. Not least of these are
the questions of the allocation of responsibility as between Member
States and the Organization, and the content of the obligations concern-
ing admission. If one insisted that each logical step-from some primary
obligation to a secondary obligation to make reparation-be supported
by observed practice and established law, then there scarcely could be
any consideration at all of the topic of responsibility for admission to the
United Nations. It is so underdeveloped that the gaps are many and
wide.332
It may be that the progressive development of humanitarian and
human rights law eventually will prove to protect the inhabitants of
under-governed or mal-governed States. To treat the problem as one of
responsibility in the stricter sense, of attachment of legal consequences
to certain States or organizations for their own stated and implicit as-
surances given at the time of independence of new States or at the time
of admission, would be at once a more conservative approach and more
radical. It would belong to that established realm of international law
concerned with relations between States and international organiza-
tions, in contrast to an approach that relies on a consolidating
international human rights law; but it would have the potential to con-
vert much of the elective activity of international aid and intervention
into obligation. In this latter respect, it would depart significantly from
established rules.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing sections have considered both the transubstantive or
secondary rules of responsibility, especially as the ILC has examined
these since 2002 in connection with international organizations, and a
specific field of possible international obligation as yet little considered
as such: the admission of States to the United Nations. In view of the
present state of legal development, the following six points may be
made:
332. The Special Rapporteur on Responsibility of International Organizations, when
considering satisfaction as a form of reparation, also encountered the problem of scarcity of
relevant practice. It therefore was necessary to refer to examples of acts akin to satisfaction but
done without express reference to the existence of a breach of an international law obligation.
Fifth Report of Special Rapporteur Gaja, supra note 108, 49, at 15.
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(i) It follows from general considerations of rule of law that cer-
tain rules of international law apply to the principal organs of
the United Nations and to the Organization as a whole. At a
minimum these include the rules of international law of per-
emptory character (jus cogens), general rules of treaty
interpretation, and the rules set out in the U.N. Charter and
developed under the Charter in practice.
(ii) A law of responsibility of the United Nations or of interna-
tional organizations generally remains underdeveloped in the
matter of the allocation of responsibility between Member
States and the organization. Nevertheless, the principal organs
of the United Nations and the Organization as a whole can
perform acts attracting international responsibility; and the
Member States, though presumed separate for purposes of re-
sponsibility from the international organizations to which
they belong, are not absolutely protected from responsibility
for the acts of those organizations.
(iii) A Member State is obliged when casting a vote on an applica-
tion for admission to membership to do so in accordance with
Article 4 of the Charter, as interpreted in the advisory opin-
ions of the ICJ and developed in practice. However, the
considerable discretion vested in each Member State as to the
internal processes leading to a vote under Article 4 makes it
highly unlikely that a State's vote could be the basis for at-
taching responsibility to the State for that act. General
considerations of the immunity of the constituents of a par-
liamentary body for their votes taken in accordance with its
rules and procedures perhaps further render doubtful that a
State could be held to have breached an obligation by the way
it cast a vote under Article 4.
(iv) The United Nations is obliged when considering an applica-
tion for admission to membership to do so in accordance with
Article 4 of the Charter, as interpreted in the advisory opin-
ions of the ICJ and developed in practice. The position of the
United Nations in matters of admission is to be distinguished
from the position of individual Member States casting votes,
insofar as the resultant decision relative to an application for
admission to membership is a decision of the Organization,
not of the Member States. The existence of mechanisms to
evaluate applications for admission and the opportunity to
communicate reasons for an affirmative decision (for exam-
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pie, in the Security Council resolution recommending admis-
sion and the General Assembly resolution effecting
admission) furnish a starting point for a system of account-
ability of the United Nations for the acts of its principal
organs under Article 4. The mechanisms in practice have been
little used.
(v) The purpose of the United Nations to promote international
peace and security is relevant to the decision of the United
Nations to admit a State as member and may add to the obli-
gations arising under Article 4.
(vi) The foregoing point would suggest that admission of an ap-
plicant should be denied or delayed where there is reason to
believe that the applicant is not capable of maintaining the
various incidents of independent statehood; or its independ-
ence is likely to cause regional or general degradation of
security. Opinion and practice however show that admission
of States to the United Nations is carried out instead with a
view to achieving universal participation in the Organization.
Opinion and practice do not contain evidence to date of any signifi-
cant development of responsibility or accountability for the admission of
States. Individual States, and to an extent organized international society,
have in practice acted in certain instances to secure the statehood of enti-
ties admitted to the United Nations as against doubts as to their ability to
exist as independent States (for example, Bosnia and the Congo). They
also have acted to ameliorate negative effects on international security
that might arise directly or indirectly from admission (for example, from
admission of the FYROM). To date, this is far from a complete devel-
opment; and it contains little or no mandatory aspect. The possibility
exists, to be sure, of future development. As the ILC said in its Commen-
tary to ARSIWA Article 36, "the categories of compensable injuries ...
are not closed. 333
333. ILC COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, 8, at 221.
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